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ABSTRACT
State mental hospitals have been depopulated rapidly since 1950.
This cannot be adequately understood as an implementation of the ideal-
ized concept of "deinstitutionalization," because adequate community
services have not been developed to care for the large numbers of men-
tally ill persons now in the community. The change in the pattern of
publicly provided mental health services is best understood as the
response of essentially passive state governments to four forces: fiscal
pressures, the availability of psychoactive drugs, changes in social
policy at the federal level and court decisions. The importance of the
deinstitutionalization concept has been to legitimate the changes occur-
ring for these other reasons. The importance of the factors listed is
demonstrated through an examination of the transformation of services in
the state of Massachusetts.
The transformation of services has often had negative consequences
for the mentally ill, as they have frequently been placed inappropriately
in nursing homes or low-quality boarding homes. Insufficient outpatient
services have been delivered, while the needs of discharged mental
patients in the community have been inadequately monitored. The prevalent
focus on the location in which the mentally ill are maintained is mis-
leading, as it obscures more fundamental issues pertaining to the quality
of care provided.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The location of a large class of mentally ill individuals has
changed radically over the past thirty years. The number of people in
state mental hospitals is now less than one-third as large as it was in
1955. The mentally ill persons traditionally housed in state hospitals
are now found in a variety of settings. This change in the pattern of
care is often referred to as "deinstitutionalization." The term "deinsti-
tutionalization" has been used in several human service areas, including
mental retardation services and youth services, to denote an ideology
which advocates a shift away from institutionalization of clients in
favor of the placement of clients in more normal living situations in the
community. The term "normal" refers simply to decreasing the difference
between the living situation of a client as compared to that of a member
of the general population. The expression "in the community" is widely
used to refer to any setting other than a traditional institution.
In the context of care for the mentally ill, deinstitutionaliza-
tion can be viewed as a shift away from the use of the state mental
hospital. Deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill is generally thought
of as having three components: (1) the prevention of mental hospital
admissions through the provision of alternate services in the community;
(2) the release to the community of hospital patients who no longer
require institutionalization; and (3) the provision of community mental
health services to non-institutionalized persons.1
While the change in the pattern of publicly provided mental health
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care appears to have many of the characteristics embodied in the idea of
deinstitutionalization, this paper argues that the pursuit of the thera-
peutic goal of deinstitutionalization has not been the only, nor even the
primary, motivation for the change. Four other forces have been very
important: (1) fiscal considerations of state governments; (2) changes in
social policy; (3) technological changes in the treatment of the mentally
ill; and (4) changes in the rights of the mentally ill, as defined by the
courts. The primary role of the deinstitutionalization idea has been to
legitimate changes motivated by these other forces. This process has had
negative consequences for the mentally ill, because the changes -- guided
as they have been by non-therapeutic concerns -- have often neglected the
true needs of the mentally ill. Unfortunately, discussion of mental health
services occurs all too often in terms of the ideology of deinstitution-
alization, ignoring the more fundamental issues which determine the
quality of public mental health care.
To observe the importance of each of the forces, it is helpful to
observe their interplay in the arena where they come together -- mental
health policy-making at the state level. The recent history of mental
health policy in Massachusetts is therefore examined in detail. The case
shows that concern for normalizing the living situation of the mentally
ill has consistently been overwhelmed by the constraints, financial and
otherwise, which set limits on the state's ability and motivation to
pursue a major social reform.
The argument is developed over five chapters. Chapter II reviews
the rise of institutional care for the mentally ill and the change in the
role of the state hospital since 1950. Chapter III describes how the
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aforementioned forces encouraged particular changes in the pattern of
services provided. Chapter IV reviews the effects of the transformation
of the mental health service system on the mentally ill. Chapter V
examines in detail the transformation, its causes and its consequences
for mentally ill individuals in Massachusetts. Finally, Chapter VI draws
conclusions regarding the lessons to be learned from examining the
process through which mental health policy has evolved.
Footnotes
Leona Bachrach, Deinstitutionalization: An Analytical Review and
Sociological Perspective. (Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental
Health, 1976), p. 1.
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II. THE HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CARE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL
Much of the recent history of public mental health service provi-
sion can be understood as an attempt to greatly reduce the number of
persons institutionalized in state mental hospitals. To better understand
this orientation, it is necessary to understand the origins of institu-
tionalization of the mentally ill. The first section of this chapter
reviews the development of mental hospitals, from their beginnings in the
nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century. The second section
examines the recent changes in the role of state mental hospitals.
A. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL, 1800-1950
In the United States, mental hospitals date back to the beginning
of the nineteenth century.
Before 1810, only a few eastern seaboard states had incorporated
private institutions to care for the mentally ill, and Virginia alone
had established a public asylum. All together they treated less than
five hundred patients, most of whom came from well-to-do families.
Few departures from colonial practices occurred in the first forty
years after independence; the insane commonly languished in local
jails or poorhouses or lived with family and friends. 1
Public attitudes were rapidly changing, however. Mental disease, once
thought of as demonical possession or punishment for sins, was increas-
ingly being viewed as an illness.2 This contributed to a rapid growth in
the number of public asylums:
in a dramatic transformation, state after state constructed asylums.
Budding manufacturing centers like New York and Massachusetts erected
institutions in the 1830s, and so did the agricultural states of
Vermont and Tennessee, Ohio and Georgia. By 1850, almost every
northeastern and midwestern legislature supported an asylum; by 1860,
twenty-eight of the thirty-three states had public institutions for
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the insane. Although not all of the mentally ill found a place within
a hospital, and a good number of the chronic poor remained in alms-
houses and jails, the institutionalization of the insane became the
standard procedure of the society during these years. A cult of
asylum swept the country.3
Many of the early hospitals employed a treatment model called
"moral treatment," which had been developed by Philippe Pinel in France.
Kindness was the fundamental ingredient in Pinel's therapeutic
approach. Seeking to gain the patient's confidence and instill in him
a sense of hope, he developed . . . "moral treatment" (which in
contemporary psychiatry corresponds to milieu therapy). Milieu
therapy involved the creation of a total therapeutic environment:
social, psychological, physical. It assumed that insanity was a
curable disease, given understanding, patience, kindness, and proper
treatment. While moral treatment employed all of the known nonmedical
techniques, it more specifically referred to therapeutic efforts
which affected a patient's psychology.4
Moral treatment involved
open wards, occupational therapy, and pleasant surroundings in small
institutions where the staff and especially the superintendent could
know the patients personally and where kindness was the rule. The
superintendent lived on the grounds, ate with the patients, and used
his personality as his best therapeutic device. The use of standard
drugs and treatment was lessened and the application of mechanical
restraints was minimized or, in some cases, almost eliminated.5
At first, moral treatment was reasonably successful. An 1893
follow-up study of people who were patients at Worcester State Hospital
during the 1830s and 1840s showed that 58% never had a relapse after
discharge from the hospital.6 A number of factors, however, rapidly
diminished the quality of care in the hospitals. Grob identifies four
influences which put increasing pressure on hospitals:
First, the existence of a mental hospital meant that jails and alms-
houses were not the only places for confinement of insane persons.
Families that had once been reluctant to send loved ones to sub-
standard institutions were now more willing to consider the possibi-
lity of institutionalization. Second, the growing urbanization made
it more and more difficult to care for the mentally ill in the
community. Deviant behavior in densely populated areas not only posed
greater problems than in rural areas, but it was also less likely to
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be tolerated. Third, the establishment of a mental hospital increased
social awareness of mental disease, and undoubtedly some of those who
had been considered quaint or odd were now looked upon as insane.
Finally, the rapid growth in population, which was partly associated
with industrialization and partly with the tremendous increase in
immigration from Ireland, was accompanied by a proportionate increase
in the number of mentally ill persons. 7
At the same time, recurring economic cycles of inflation and depression
resulted in pressure on legislators to limit government expenditures. As
poor immigrants began to fill the state hospitals, there was less and
less willingness to provide the high level of care which characterized
moral treatment.8 Some states built additional hospitals, but even so
"overcrowding became endemic in state hospitals." 9
It was common for state governments to charge local municipalities
the costs of treating acute patients while assuming the costs of treating
chronic patients. This had the effect of increasing the number of chronic
patients in the care of hospitals. Chronic patients were unlikely to
respond even to well-administered moral treatment and, thus, the recovery
rates in state mental hospitals rapidly declined.l0 This served to bolster
the arguments of those who claimed that mental illness was incurable,
many of them Social Darwinists who held that "the plight of the chronic-
ally insane person was caused by inferior genetic environment and not by
social or environmental factors."11 During the same period, a somatic
view of psychiatric illness as a physical, not a psychosocial, disorder
was rising. The implication was that moral treatment could not cure
mental illness; rather, it was necessary to wait for medical science to
discover the diseases which caused insanity.
1 2
,
1 3
,
1 4
State hospital superintendents realized that the effectiveness of
institutionalization was rapidly decreasing, but nevertheless permitted
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the proportion of chronic patients in their care to rise. This was
because
[t]he superintendents feared that separate establishments for the
chronic would rapidly degenerate into places as bad or even worse
than the crudest almshouse. They may also have been wary about promo-
ting a venture that would compete with their own for limited state
funds. But they were also taking for themselves a function apart
from cure, so as to base their task on less speculative and difficult
grounds. Officials abandoned a high risk, high success operation for
a minimum risk, minimum success one. Rather than rest the future of
the asylum on the ability to rehabilitate the mentally ill they
assumed the failure-proof task of caring for the chronic.lt
Thus, state hospitals ceased to function as therapeutic institutions and
became custodial institutions. Eventually, "the group with the least
prospect for rehabilitation took over the asylum." 1 6
The middle class quickly became aware of the declining conditions
in state hospitals. Private sanitaria sprang up in the Northeast and
attracted increasingly large numbers of paying patients as state govern-
ments raised the fees charged those who could afford to pay for care in
state hospitals.
By 1860, a two-class mental care system was in place -- the private
and the public. State asylums were no longer viewed as treatment
settings for all Americans, but as custodial facilities for the
chronically insane poor, a group identified with despised ethnic
groups who lacked political power.1 7
As early as the 1860s, the type of care provided in state hospi-
tals was being criticized. Scull quotes the Massachusetts State Board of
Charities Annual Report of 1867, which refers to
"the sight of so many patients in the prime of life sitting or lying
about, moping idly and listlessly in the debilitating atmosphere of
the wards, and sinking gradually into a torpor, like that of living
corpses. . . . "18
As early as the nineteenth century, there were advocates of community
care for the mentally ill, advocates of deinstitutionalization. Bemis,
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writing in the Worcester State Hospital Annual Report of 1869, argues that
no individual "should ever be confined to a lunatic hospital if he can
have proper care and control out of it."19 In 1871, Maudsley wrote in his
book, The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind:
"Instead of acting upon the general principle of confining the insane
in asylums, and making the particular exceptions, we ought to act on
the general principle of depriving no one of his liberty, and then
making the necessary exceptions."20
In spite of widespread criticism, state hospitals continued to be
built and state mental health services remained entirely institutional.
As Scull points out, this is not entirely surprising, because
the very basis of the critics' case rested on a fundamental misreading
of the public's concerns. The central element of their critique was
that asylums were a therapeutic disaster. And one may grant that for
those who still saw the cure as the primary issue, the fact that
asylums were "more almshouses than hospitals" was a condemnation of the
entire system. But to those who were already convinced of the value
of a custodial operation (and most of the influential classes . .
as well as the asylum superintendents, now felt this way), such
complaints were simply an irrelevance.
For all the criticisms which could be made of them, asylums were
still a convenient way of getting rid of inconvenient people. The
community was used, by now, to disposing of the derelict and trouble-
some in this fashion, placing them where, as one physician put it,
"they are for the most harmless because they are kept out of harm's
way." . . . Asylums' earlier association with social reform gave a
lingering humanitarian gloss to the huge, cheap, and avowedly custo-
dial dumps where the refuse of the community was now collected toge-
ther. Meanwhile, medical control of these institutions, and the rheto-
ric about the cure that went with that control, provided a further
legitimation of the custodial warehousing of these, the most diffi-
cult and troublesome of the disreputable poor. Working people had
little alternative but to make use of the asylum as a way of ridding
themselves of what, in the context of nineteenth century working
class existence, was undoubtedly an intolerable burden: the caring
for their sick, aged, decrepit, or otherwise incapacitated relatives,
From the upper classes' perspective, the existence of asylums to
"treat" the insane at public expense could be invoked as a practical
demonstration of their own humanitarian concern for the less
fortunate.2 1
All public care for the mentally ill continued to be institutional
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throughout the early part of the twentieth century. A former mental
patient, Clifford Beers, drew some attention to the poor conditions in
the hospitals with his book A Mind That Found Itself, published in 1908.
Beers was also the driving force behind the National Committee for Mental
Hygiene, founded in 1909. He
at first conceived of the National Committee as a vehicle for
[thorough and long-term reform of mental hospitals], initially to
consist of the abolition of mechanical restraints and the provision
of comfortable, pleasant environments. . . . [T]he National Committee
did effect some improvements -- partial eradication of the worst
abuses and in a few instances the construction of new hospitals --
but these accomplishments were vitiated during the great depression
of the 1930s. 2 2
The hospitals were under the control of superintendents reluctant to deal
with the Committee; and the superintendents were themselves under the
control of politicians who
all too frequently fired and hired hospital chiefs for reasons of
politics or patronage and . . . as a rule were interested only in
operating state institutions as cheaply as possible. To protect their
jobs, superintendents tended to moderate their demands to fit the
thinking of their employers. By the 20th century the resistance of
hospital psychiatrists to large, overcrowded, understaffed, and
underfinanced state institutions -- run like inefficient factories at
the lowest possible cost -- was at best nominal; their role had been
reduced to that of chief custodians who could not afford to provide
treatment or permit staff members to try innovative practices. 2 3
It was not until World War II, when a large number of men were
rejected for military service because of psychiatric disorders, that
mental health policy became an issue of public concern. In 1946, the
National Mental Health Act was passed. The act established a national
mental health program, with the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)
its primary creation. The leadership of NIMH was committed to community,
as opposed to institutional, treatment of mental disorders. As the NIMH
began to lobby for community mental health services, deinstitutionaliza-
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tion finally became a popular cause. During the 1950s, under a variety of
pressures, the use of state mental hospitals began to change.
B. THE CHANGING ROLE OF STATE HOSPITALS SINCE 1950
After growing consistently for more than a century, the number of
residents in state hospitals suddenly peaked and began to decline. This
decline in the number of inpatients cared for at any given moment is the
most conspicuous change in the role of the state hospital. As shown in
Figure 1, the number of residents decreased from a maximum of 559,000 in
1955 to only 171,000 in 1976.
This census decline occurred primarily because hospitals began
keeping residents for shorter lengths of time. As shown in Figure 2, the
number of inpatient care episodes24 declined at a much slower rate than
did the inpatient census, decreasing from 819,000 in 1955 to 574,000 in
1977. This decrease was not due to a decrease in the demand for state
hospital services. As Figure 3 shows, the number of first admissions to
state hospitals continued to increase until 1969, reaching a peak of
164,000, up from 130,000 in 1962.
The average length-of-stay in a state hospital declined for both
acute (short-stay) and chronic (long-stay) patients. It has been estimated
that the average length-of-stay of acute patients has declined from eight
months in 1954 to 1.5 months in 1971.25 Most of the decrease in the resi-
dent census of institutions, however, is accounted for by the decrease in
the number of chronic patients. Using as a measure of chronicity a
current length-of-stay of 1.5 years or more, there were 426,000 chronic
patients in state hospitals in 1960 (79% of the total). By 1970 this
number had fallen to 254,000 (72% of the total). 2 6
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Figure 1. Number of Residents in State and County Mental Hospitals,
United States, 1955-1976.
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Sources: U.S. General Accounting Office, Returning The Mentally Disabled
To The Community: Government Need To Do More (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 8; Laura Milazzo-Sayre,
"Changes in the Age, Sex and Diagnostic Composition of the Resident
Population of State and County Mental Hospitals, United States
1965-1975," Statistical Note 146 (Rockville, Md.: National Insti-
tute of Mental Health, Biometry Branch, 1978), p. 4; and Michael
J. Witkin, "Provisional Patient Movement and Selective Administra-
tive Data, Inpatient Services by State, United States 1976,"
Statistical Note No. 153 (Rockville, Md.: National Institute of
Mental Health, 1979), p. 2.
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Figure 2. Annual Number of Inpatient Care Episodes in State and County
Mental Hospitals, United States, 1955-1977.
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Source: Michael J. Witkin, "Trends in Patient Care Episodes in Mental
Health Facilities, 1955-1977," Statistical Note No. 154
(Rockville, Md.: National Institute of Mental Health, Biometry
Branch, 1980), p. 12
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Figure 3. Number of First Admissions, Total Admissions and Net Releases,
State and County Mental Hospitals, United States, 1950-1974.
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The consequence of earlier release of patients has been a drama-
tic increase in the number of patients being readmitted to state hospi-
tals after having been discharged. As Figure 3 shows, the proportion of
admissions to state hospitals which are readmissions has increased from
25% in 1950 to 64% in 1972.
These statistics all suggest a profound transformation in the
way state hospitals provide services to the mentally ill. They also
raise two important questions. First, why was there such a dramatic
change? The deficiencies of state hospitals had been recognized since
the 1860s, but institutional censuses only began to decline in the 1950s.
Yet the drop was so rapid that by 1976, after only twenty years, the
inpatient population was about the same as it had been in 1910. Second,
what became of the mentally ill when they were no longer cared for in
state hospitals? Although state hospitals had a poor reputation for
patient care, they did provide their patients with room and board and at
least a semblance of therapeutic care. Who cared for the patients when
they were discharged back into the community? The following two chapters
take up these two questions in turn.
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III. CAUSES OF THE TRANSFORMATION IN THE
PATTERN OF PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PROVISION
Throughout the period of depopulation of state institutions, the
idea of deinstitutionalization of mental health care has been in good
currency. It is therefore necessary to examine how the popularity of the
idea has contributed to the transformation of mental health service
provision. It seems unlikely, however, that the mere popularity of a
reformist social idea could alone motivate a change as large as has
occurred. One is therefore led to seek additional causes for the change.
In seeking these causes, it is necessary to examine the situation of the
state governments which bear the primary responsibility of caring for the
mentally ill. Such an examination leads one to consider the forces which
would compel state legislators and administrators to change their poli-
cies and the constraints which limit their options. The one consideration
of state governments which is most immediately apparent is that of fiscal
demands and constraints. One obvious motivation for depopulation of
institutions is the need to limit expenditures in the face of increasing
demands on state budgets. Another consideration is essentially technolo-
gical. Whether or not state hospitals were functional in rehabilitating
the mentally ill, they performed important social functions: they
protected society from the mentally ill and protected the mentally ill
from themselves. They also provided food and shelter for their residents.
The freedom of states to release the mentally ill to the community has
therefore been limited by the technology available to insure that these
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needs continue to be satisfied outside the hospital. A third considera-
tion is the context of national social policy in which state governments
operate. Federal programs create incentives and disincentives to provide
services in a given manner, while federal regulations create constraints
on the freedom of state governments to pursue particular options. Finally,
constraints are also created by the courts when their decisions restrict
the freedom of state governments to treat the mentally ill in certain
ways. All these considerations have had implications for the manner in
which states have chosen to provide mental health services. In this
chapter, the importance of each consideration will be examined.
A. PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL OPINION
The provision of mental health care in the community and not in
institutions became a popular cause as a result of continuing awareness
of the poor conditions in mental hospitals and professional lobbying in
support of the development of community services. The general public
was informed through the media of the problems with the hospitals:
In May 1947, Life published a bold photographic essay called "Bedlam
USA"; it was later reprinted in the Reader's Digest under the title
"The Shame of Our Mental Hospitals." A story in Woman's Home
Companion, "What Is Wrong with Our Mental Hospitals?" became the
subject of radio debates. Twentieth Century-Fox made a movie out of
The Snake Pit, a best seller by Mary Jane Ward, a former mental
patient. Throughout the country, many newspapers reported on mental
institutions. The Kansas City Times, for example, ran a series of
articles by Charles W. Graham, who recorded the deleterious effects
of apathy on patients in Missouri and Kansas state hospitals.
Patients, he noted, simply sat in rocking chairs, "hopelessly rocking
away their hours, days, and months and years."i
Within the psychiatric community, the American Journal of Psychiatry
called the condition of mental hospitals "a disgrace to our civiliza-
tion."2
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The leadership of NIMH, predisposed as it was toward the develop-
ment of community mental health services, used its influence to sponsor
demonstration community programs (the first in Maryland in 1949) and to
disseminate information about their success throughout the psychiatric
community. As a result of the success of the war effort, the American
public was optimistic about the prospects of addressing domestic ills
and, consequently, the NIMH leaders found fertile ground for discussion
of their ideas. Mental health was enough of a political issue that, in
1955, the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health was established
in order to study how the nation's mental health could be improved. The
Joint Commission produced a report, entitled Action for Mental Health,
in 1961. The Commission envisioned a continuing role for state hospitals,
but suggested that they be smaller, better financed and used only for
4
intensive psychiatric treatment. The report also advocated the develop-
ment of a national system of community mental health clinics.5
It was the latter recommendation which dominated the federal
legislation which followed the Joint Commission's report. The NIMH
leaders who participated in drafting the legislation were more concerned
with the development of community services than with the improvement of
state hospitals,6 while politicians were understandably reluctant to
support the much maligned mental hospital. President Kennedy drew atten-
tion to the legislative initiative with his personal interest. The
legislation provided funds for the construction of Community Mental Health
Centers (CMHCs), which Vere to provide comprehensive inpatient and
outpatient mental health services to catchment areas with 200,000 people
or less. The popular sentiment in favor of the dismantling of the mental
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hospital is in evidence in President Kennedy's statement when signing the
bill into law:
"Under this legislation, custodial institutions will be replaced by
therapeutic centers. It should be possible, within a decade or two,
to reduce the number of persons in mental institutions by 50 percent
or more."7
While the value of the legislation in decreasing the need for
state hospitals is questionable, its passage was indicative of unprece-
dented public and professional support for the concept of development of
community mental health services as an alternative to state hospitals.
The idea of deinstitutionalization clearly did exist in the popular and
professional imagination and cannot be ignored in a discussion of the
reasons behind the transformation of mental health service provision.
Other forces, however, were probably more important, in that they were
more immediately felt by officials in state government.
B. FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the 1950s, mental health services was a catgory of state
government expenditures which appeared ready to explode in size. As Scull
points out:
by the mid-1950s much of the physical plant of the mental hospital
[system] . . . in . . . America, largely an inheritance from the
nineteenth century, were rapidly approaching a degree of decay and
decrepitude which would have made replacement mandatory. Moreover,
annual admissions were already displaying a marked tendency to rise
from one year to the next. . . . If the proportion of admissions
becoming chronic long-stay cases had remained at or close to its
historic levels, substantial new construction would obviously have
been called for.8
Unable to limit the number of admissions to their hospitals, states could
only keep down the size of their instititionalized population by releasing
patients more quickly, which they began to do in the 1950s. The result
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was that "mental hospitals were pictured as 'dying' institutions on which
it was naturally foolish to spend any more by way of renovation -- and
capital expenditure on them was reduced to a minimum."9
With the increasing awareness about mental illness in the general
public, community resistance to the faster release of mental patients was
less of an obstacle than it had been in the past. And, as will be seen,
technological change removed another constraint in the way of depopula-
tion of institutions, while national social policy increased the incen-
tive to depopulate.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE -- THE ROLE OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS
One of the primary reasons that mentally ill persons have tradi-
tionally been institutionalized is to protect society, as well as the
patients themselves, from their dangerous or bizarre behavior. States
were limited in the number of patients they could release from hospitals
by their inability to control the behavior of the patients outside the
hospital. In the 1950s, however, psychoactive drugs were introduced.
These had the property of being able to temporarily control some of this
objectionable behavior. Where in earlier years patients who occasionally
acted out psychotically needed to be institutionalized, it was now
possible to discharge these patients with a supply of psychoactive drugs.
Within the hospitals, it was possible to use the drugs as "chemical
straitjackets," so that less time would be spent controlling patients and
more time spent rehabilitating them. Much of the psychiatric community
believes that depopulation of institutions was only possible with the
introduction of these drugs. For example, Becker and Schulberg write that
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The therapeutic efficacy of state hospitals was most improved,
however, by the introduction in the 1950s of potent antipsychotic
pharmacologic agents that, for the first time, gave psychiatrists
effective weapons to battle schizophrenia and other psychotic ill-
ness. The ability of phenothiazines to control agressive, destructive
behavior and to reduce psychotic symptoms led to major changes in the
state hospital's atmosphere. Optimism gradually replaced pessimism.
Newly admitted patients were actively treated with phenothiazines,
acute symptoms were relieved, and patients were frequently discharged
within three to six weeks. Patients who were chronically ill also
responded to these drugs, many showing a decrease in disruptive,
agressive behavior and others becoming less withdrawn and regressed.
Rehabilitation programs were initiated to enhance work skills, foster
resocialization, and bring the chronically institutionalized person
to the point where community placement was possible.1 0
The growth in the use of the drugs was phenomenal. At the end of
1953, chlorpromazine had been tested on 104 psychiatric patients in the
United States; thirteen months later it was being given to approximately
two million patients.11
Whether the drugs were so useful as to cause the remarkable
depopulation of state hospitals is very doubtful. Scull cites a number
of studies which found no correlation between the use of drugs and
patient retention rates and points out that the average length-of-stay in
state hospitals was already declining before the introduction of drugs. 1 2
Even if one assumes that the drugs are effective, there is no guarantee
that a mentally ill person living independently in the community would
use them. Nevertheless, it is clear that faith in the value of the drugs
is widespread. At a minimum, the existence of psychoactive drugs provided
the justification for the discharge of some hospital residents and
decreased community resistance to the release of patients.
D. NATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY
The high cost of institutional care gave states an incentive to
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discharge state hospital patients as quickly as possible, but states
could not release the more severely ill patients without incurring sub-
stantial costs in order to provide for them in the community. The
patients were, after all, often unable to support themselves. Many also
required some form of custodial, if not medical, care. The rise of the
largely federally financed welfare state decreased many of the costs to
states of maintaining their mentally ill in the community. This occurred
primarily through the expansion of income transfer programs and through
increasing support for long-term health care.
1. Income Transfer Policy
Perhaps the most important change in national social policy was
the growth of income transfer programs. That growth was characterized by
increasing federal assumption of responsibility for income transfers. As
Scull points out, the maintenance of the mentally ill in the community
was unfeasible before the development of these programs:
Consider . . . what [a] . . . policy of managing the insane in the
community would have involved. Keeping lunatics "on the outside"
would have entailed making provision for relatively generous pension
or welfare payments for their support. But at the least this would
have raised the possibility that the living standards of families
with an insane member would have been raised above those of the
working class generally. Moreover, under this system, the insane
alone would have been beneficiaries of something approximating a
modern social welfare system, while their sane brethren were being
subjected to the rigors of a Poor Law based on the principle of less
eligibility. Such an approach would clearly have been administratively
unworkable, especially given the labile nature of lunacy itself, and
the consequent ever present possibility that given sufficient incen-
tive (or rather desperation), the poorer classes would resort to
feigning insanity.13
The situation changed with the passage of the Social Security Act
in the 1930s and the gradual expansion of eleigibility and benefits pro-
vided under the Act. With increasing numbers of cash recipients under the
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various titles of the Act and the increasing adequacy of benefits, there
were fewer fiscal dangers in providing for the mentally ill in the commu-
nity. Indeed, the mentally ill became eligible to receive federal funds
under the Totally and Permanently Disabled provisions of the Social
Security Act, eventually subsumed by the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program. Although many states supplemented SSI benefits, the cost
to a state of maintaining a mentally disabled individual in the community
on SSI benefits was far lower than the cost of institutionalization. A
U.S. Senate committee concluded that, of the many factors that
come together to force the mentally impaired out of State hospitals
into nursing homes, boarding homes, old hotels -- and sometimes into
the streets [,] [t]he desire to save State dollars is clearly the
most important . . . The enactment of the SSI program presents an
opportunity of substituting Federal for State dollars. Assuming that
a State is paying $10,000 to $20,000 a year per patient in its State
hospitals and that the patient can be placed in boarding homes for
$1,884 a year ($157 a month) in Federal SSI funds, the net impact on
the State budget is a gain of thousands of dollars per patient per
year! 14
Rose shows in detail how the calculation looked for the government of
New York state, where the state subsidizes federal SSI payments substan-
tially, in 1974:
In New York, . . . the [average annual cost of caring for a person in
a public mental hospital] was $13,835. The cost of outpatient care in
New York, or aftercare combined with outpatient care, during 1974 was
$531 per person per year of state mental health department funds.
This fantastic saving was offset somewhat by the fact that a person
discharged from the hospital was neccessarily referred to SSI; this
meant that residents of New York who were placed in adult homes
received a monthly check of $386.70 . . . The monthly cost to the
state for each SSI recipient living in an adult home was $219.00,
while the federal share was $167.70. On an annual basis, the cost to
the state of New York for such a person consisted of $2,628 of SSI
funds (or less if the person was placed in a boarding home or hotel),
plus $531 of mental health funds. If an overestimate of $1,500 is
added for various services, the total still comes to just over $4,600
some $9,000 less than the annual per person cost of hospitalization.1
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The SSI program not only encouraged the maintenance of the
mentally ill outside state hospitals; the design of the program also
discouraged the provision of any meaningful rehabilitative services to
them in the community. Persons housed in state-operated programs,
including community residences, were, before 1976, ineligible to receive
SSI, which meant that states had to assume the entire cost of any such
care which they provided. The states were free to place the mentally ill
in privately-operated halfway houses. However, the amount of SSI payments
was generally insufficient to purchase much beyond room and board. If
states supplemented private halfway house operators with their own funds,
the state funds were considered to be part of the income of the residents
of the house, with the result that federal SSI payments were decreased.
States therefore found it advantageous to house individuals in nursing
homes instead of community residences. Although the total cost of the
nursing home placement was higher, at least one-half was assumed by the
federal government under the Medicaid program, with the result that the
placement was often less costly to the state than a placement in a
community residence. 1 6
2. Health Policy
The Medicaid program was perhaps the most significant component
of the other major change in national social policy, the federal initia-
tive to improve the quality of and increase access to medical care. The
Medicaid program, created in the 1965 amendments to the Social Security
Act, reimbursed states 50% or more (depending on the income level in the
state) of the costs of health care of persons receiving income transfers
under other titles of the Act. As the numbers of people included under
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these income transfer titles multiplied, so did the number of people
receiving Medicaid benefits. By 1969, 12,060,000 persons were receiving
Medicaid benefits; by 1978, 21,795,000.17 Disability was the basis of
eligibility for benefits of 1,200,000 of these recipients in 1969 and of
2,900,000 of these recipients in 1978.18 Mental illness was the disabling
condition of perhaps 19% of the disabled category.19
An important feature of the Medicaid program, and also of the
Medicare program created at the same time, was its support of care in
nursing homes. The federal government wished to see an expansion of the
nursing home industry because, with a rapidly growing elderly population,
the demand for hospital care was increasing rapidly. Nursing home care was
seen as a less costly alternative for providing extended care to those
(mostly elderly) people which required it.20 With the newly available
federal funds, the nursing home industry expanded: the number of nursing
home beds more than doubled, from 510,180 to 1,174,800, between 1963 and
1973-74.21 By 1977, Medicaid alone financed one-half (50.8%) of all
personal health care expenditures in nursing homes, although it paid for
only 11.5% of the total amount of personal health care expenditures.22 It
appears, then, that the existence of Medicaid was in large measure
responsible for an increase in the number of nursing home beds available.
From the perspective of individual states, Medicaid had two
important effects: (1) it greatly increased the number of nursing home
beds available for placement of mentally ill persons; and (2) it paid for
at least one-half of the cost of nursing home placement of the mentally
ill who might otherwise have been maintained in state hospitals. As
nursing home care for the mentally ill was far less expensive than state
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hospital care, states had both the incentive and the supply of beds needed
to permit the discharge of those hospital residents which would have been
unable to live independently outside the hospital and which had no friends
or family to care for them in the community.
The design of the Medicaid program was significant not only in
its encouragement of nursing home care, but also in its lack of support
for any of the other types of community care which might have been more
appropriate for the care of some of the mentally ill. Medicaid was not
available to persons housed in community residences, nor was it provided
for such essentially non-medical (although therapeutic) services as
sheltered workshops. Thus, Medicaid created an incentive not only to
depopulate institutions, but also to place mentally ill persons in
inappropriate community settings. \..
The Medicaid program gave states yet one more reason to depopu-
late their mental hospitals. The Medicaid program provided funds to care
for some of the residents of state hospitals, but only if the hospitals
met federal guidelines for quality of care. The prospect of 50% reimburse-
ment of patient care costs was attractive to states, but the federal
guidelines required greater per patient expenditures and limited the
number of patients which could be housed in individual institutions. The
effect was to encourage states to depopulate their institutions more
rapidly so that they could comply with federal standards more easily.
3. Summary
This review of the effects on the mentally ill of changes in
federal income transfer and health policy presents a picture of programs
conceived with broad social goals in mind but which had inadvertant
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effects on the mentally ill. The income transfer programs, conceived as
part of an attack on poverty, removed the financial incentive for states
to confine the mentally ill in institutions. The health programs, aimed
at improving access to health care while keeping down per patient costs
through the stimulation of nursing home development, encouraged states to
place their mentally ill in nursing homes. The medically oriented design
of the Medicaid program -- reflected both (1) in the inclusion of skilled
nursing care but not psychosocial rehabilitation as reimbursable services
and (2) in the promulgation of regulations mandating improvements in the
standards of care in all reimbursable services, not excluding mental
hospitals -- limited the range of community care options which were
attractive to states while putting increased pressure on states to
depopulate their mental hospitals.
E. COURT DECISIONS
The final major force affecting states' decisions to change their
patterns of care for the mentally ill has been the judicial system. Court
decisions have encouraged states to depopulate institutions by raising the
standards of care required in, and therefore the costs of, state hospi-
tals.
In Wyatt v. Stickney, the U.S. District Court held that patients
could not be committed to Bryce State Hospital in Alabama if it provided
only custodial, and not therapeutic, care:
When patients are . . . [involuntarily committed through noncriminal
procedures and without the constitutional protections that are
afforded defendants in criminal proceedings] for treatment purposes
they unquestionably have the constitutional right to receive such
individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity
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to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition. . . . The
purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is
treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment. This is the only
justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil
commitments to mental institutions. . . . According to the evidence
in this case, the failure of Bryce Hospital to supply adequate treat-
ment is due to a lack of operating funds. The failure to provide
suitable and adequate treatment to the mentally ill cannot be justi-
fied by lack of staff or facilities. . . .
There can be no legal (or moral) justification for the State of
Alabama's failing to afford treatment -- and adequate treatment from
a medical standpoint -- to the several thousand patients who have
been civilly committed to Bryce's for treatment purposes. To deprive
any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the
confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to pro-
vide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due
process. [Emphasis in original.]2 3
The Court imposed minimum standards of care which covered both the physi-
cal environment of and the level of services provided at the hospital.
The decision not only increased patient care costs at Bryce, but also
served notice to other hospitals that, unless they provide therapeutic
care to their residents, they too might find themselves operating under
the direction of a federal court.
In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that confinement of a
person in an institution "without more" -- presumably, something beyond
custodial care -- is unconstitutional if that person is capable of living
in a less restrictive setting. The decision in Donaldson v. O'Connor read,
in part:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking
a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement. Assuming that the term can be given a reason-
ably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can be identified
with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for
confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one
and can live safely in freedom.
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May the State confine the mentally ill merely to ensure
them a living standard superior to that they enjoy in the private
community? That the State has a proper interest in providing care and
assistance to the unfortunate goes without saying. But the mere
presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from preferring
his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover, while the State
may arguably confine a person to save hom from harm, incarceration is
rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising the living standards
of those capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with
the help of family or friends.
In short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends. 24
Donaldson v. O'Connor did not, however, consider the possibility
of alternative treatment settings in the community, nor has any decision
specified minimum standards of care for persons placed in community pro-
grams. Thus, the effect of federal court decisions has been to raise the
cost of institutional care for the mentally ill without raising the cost
of maintaining the mentally ill in the community.
A possible additional effect of court decisions has been to
limit the ease with which persons can be committed to state hospitals. In
1974, in Lynch v. Baxley, the U.S. District Court overturned Alabama's
commitment procedure and set out a far more rigorous procedure.25 A few
states have tightened their commitment procedures to make involuntary
commitment more difficult, but it is not clear that this has been a
response to the courts. The new procedures have given state hospitals
increased power to limit their admissions, permitting depopulation of
institutions beyond that achievable through discharge policies alone.
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F. SUMMARY
To summarize, states have had a large financial incentive to
depopulate their mental hospitals. The trend towards early discharge of
patients which became apparent in the 1950s was a response to the over-
crowding and poor physical condition of state hospitals. The financial
incentives to depopulate institutions increased under the influence of
federal programs and court decisions which required higher standards of
care in institutions. Between 1967 and 1976, the daily maintenance
expenditure per resident patient in state hospitals increased from $8.84
to $43.55.26
At the same time, constraints limiting the freedom of states to
maintain the mentally ill outside state ho'pitals either disappeared or
became less important. The introduction in the 1950s of psychoactive drugs
with the power of controlling symptoms of psychiatric illness made mainte-
nance of the mentally ill in the community a more viable, or at least
socially acceptable, proposition. The expansion of federal income transfer
programs provided funds to support mentally ill persons in the community
and so decreased the costs to states of community care. Federal health
programs provided additional funds for community care and increased the
supply of nursing home beds available to accomodate those ,ho otherwise
would have required state hospital care. The structure of federal pro-
grams, however, determined by broader social concerns, encouraged the
placement of the mentally ill in nursing homes instead of in alternative
community settings.
Throughout the period of depopulation of state hospitals, the
ideology of deinstitutionalization has enjoyed some popularity, both
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among mental health personnel and among the general public. This popula-
rity is, however, best understood as a recognition of the problems with
state hospital care. Advocacy of deinstitutionslization has therefore
encouraged rapid depopulation. The fiscal incentives have nevertheless
been sufficiently great that it seems likely that significant depopulation
of state hospitals would have occurred even in the absence of a- conspi-
cuous deinstitutionalization movement.
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TRANSFORMATION IN THE
PATTERN OF PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PROVISION
As a result of the rapid depopulation of state hospitals, many
more severely mentally ill people now live in the community than did in
the past. This chapter examines the living situation of those mentally
ill individuals in the community who, in the absence of a depopulation of
state hospitals, would probably have been institutionalized.
Although many persons were perhaps inappropriately institutional-
ized prior to the 1950s, state hospitals nevertheless provided important
services to much of the low-income mentally ill population. Most funda-
mentally, they provided shelter and basic services. The poor quality of
both these aspects of state hospital care were widely criticized and,
indeed, the foundation of the deinstitutionalization movement's populari-
ty. The depopulation of institutions, however, was a response not so much
to the deinstitutionalization movement as to the fiscal pressures bearing
on state governments. It is not surprising, then, that the services pro-
vided to the mentally ill in the community have frequently been no better
than those provided in state hospitals.
The first section of this chapter reviews the characteristics and
needs of the class of people traditionally cared for in state hospitals.
The second section examines where in the community they are housed, while
the third section examines the kind of rehabilitative services they
receive.
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A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
The population traditionally served by state hospitals has two
major characteristics. First, its socioeconomic status is low. More af-
fluent mentally ill persons have the financial resources, including insur-
ance coverage, with which to purchase higher quality private psychiatric
care. Second, its mental disorders are severe. Given the traditional
negative image of care in state hospitals, institutionalization has long
been viewed as a last resort. Where care has previously been provided by
family, admission of an individual to a state hospital has therefore also
represented the limits of the family's ability and/or willingness to care
for the mentally ill person. Many hospitals residents have had no family
to which they could turn for assistance upon release from the hospital.
The resident population of state hospitals can be subdivided into
two types: acute and chronic. "Acute" refers to short-stay (typically,
less than one year) patients, "chronic" to long-stay. Some acute patients
come from relatively normal living situations, are admitted at a time of
severe stress, and frequently return to a normal life. Others have more
persistent problems and require frequent readmission to the hospital.
They are frequently referred to as the "revolving-door" population. This
latter group is more typically stable when outside the hospital and often
has fewer family and friends to depend upon for social support.
Although there are many acute patients, their lengths of stay are
sufficiently short that the bulk of state hospital residents at any one
time are chronically ill. Using as a measure of chronicity a current hos-
pital stay of 1.5 years or more, Minkoff estimates that, in 1960, 79%
(426,077) of state hospital residents were chronically ill and that in 1970,
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72% (253,943) were chronically ill. It is the release of these individuals
to the community which accounts for most of the decline in state hospital
censuses. Minkoff estimates that, in 1974, the number of chronically ill
hospital residents (using a one-year minimum length of stay) was declining
at a net rate of about 18,000 per year. There were about 37,000 new
chronic patients while 38,000 were discharged and 17,000 died. While most
rehospitalization of discharged chronic patients is a frequent occurrence,
Minkoff estimates that 90% of those chronic patients who have been dis-
charged are outside the hospital at any given time. Although the death rate
of discharged patients may be high, this nevertheless suggests that the
large majority of the chronically ill persons historically cared for in
state hospitals are now in the community.
The acutely and chronically ill groups both require the same ba-
sic services in the community: they need shelter, sustenance and suffi-
cient mental health care to help prevent readmission. There are important
differences, however. The chronic population, because of its long isola-
tion from community life, can benefit greatly from a gradual transition to
independent living, as is provided in facilities such as halfway houses.
Acute patients, on the other hand, are more often able to return directly
to a relatively normal living situation. The revolving-door acute popu-
lation can benefit greatly from readily available outpatient services in
the community, as these can help overcome psychiatric episodes before they
become so severe as to require hospitalization. Unfortunately, the severely
ill population is unlikely, becuase of the very nature of its ailments, to
successfully seek out and find psychiatric services without active outreach
and client tracking on the part of community service providers.
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B. RESIDENTIAL LIVING ARRANGEMENT
1. Location in the Community
Advocates of deinstitutionalization do not expect the majority of
hospital residents, especially chronic patients, to live independently upon
release from the hospital. Rather, they envision a continuum of incremen-
tally less restrictive settings, each of which provides enough rehabilita-
tion to enable the patient to move on towards a more normal setting. It
is understood that many of the more severely ill patients will only ad-
vance part of the way along the continuum. The goal, however, is to permit
patients to live as normal a life as possible, to reach the limits of their
capabilities and to prevent regression. In practice, however, the number
of individuals released to such transitional facilities is negligible, be-
cause relatively few such facilities exist. Where they do exist, they sel-
dom form a complete continuum of services, with the result that those fa-
cilities which do exist are often inappropriately used.
The settings in which discharged hospital residents are most com-
monly placed are: their family homes, nursing homes, board-and-care homes,
and other independent living arrangements (e.g. apartments in old hotels,
one-room apartments, etc.).2 Table 1 shows the findings of a number of
studies regarding the destination of discharged hospital residents. The
Alabama study was conducted early in the process of institution depopula-
tion and corresponds with other studies which show that traditionally over
65% of discharged patients have returned to their families. The Virginia
study, conducted later in the process of depopulation, shows a smaller
percentage (48%) returning to family. The 1975 New York City study shows
only 23% returning to family. An earlier New York City study, conducted
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Table 1. Percent of Discharged Mental Patients in Selected Community
Settings, Various Studies.
Destination Study
Calif. Mass.
VirginiaPenn. a . (chronicVirginia New York .en (chronic hoiAlabama Newcork on hrncc 65+(1974) (1975) (chronic under 65
1960) 1972) released
en masse)
Transitional 5 4 8
facility
* *
Family 72 48 23 33 26 --
Nursing 14 -- 11 -- 9 43
homes
Board-and- -- 10 -- 22 49 19
care homes
Other 3 31 38 45 11 27
apartments
Other or 6 11 28 -- 1 --
Unknown
* Rest homes
** 27% in "Other apartments" is made up of 8% in "cooperative apartments,"
19% in "independent living." Some of the "independent living" were
probably placed with families.
Source: Adapted from Kenneth Minkoff, "A Map of Chronic Mental Patients,"
in The Chronic Mental Patient in the Community: Problems,
Solutions, and Recommendations for a Public Policy (Washington,
D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1978), pp. 18, 28.
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in the mid-1960's, showed two-thirds of discharges returning to families.
The decrease in the number of discharges placed with families is probably
a reflection of the fact that, as the depopulation of institutions has ad-
vanced, the patients remaining in institutions have been the difficult-
to-place residents, many of them difficult-to-place because of their lack
of meaningful ties in the community.
The percentage of hospital residents being discharged to family
has always been lower for chronic than for acute patients. The 1960
Pennsylvania study of chronic discharges shows that only 33% were placed
with families. The later (1972) California study shows the majority (60%)
of non-elderly chronic discharges being placed in board-and-care homes
and other similar settings. The Massachusetts data for a group of elderly
chronic patients released en masse shows heavy reliance on nursing homes
(43% of placements). This is indicative of the elderly population's
lack of family supports; a Canadian study showed that only 9% of the el-
derly chronically ill return to families. In 1969, 40% of discharged
elderly residents of state hospitals were placed in nursing homes. Of the
chronically ill elderly, 58% of discharges were placed in nursing homes.
Thus, a substantial number of hospital patients, especially chronic pa-
tients, have been placed in nursing and boarding homes. Among the chroni-
cally ill, the elderly have more often been placed in nursing homes, while
the non-elderly have typically been placed in less intensive settings.
Examination of where hospital residents are placed upon discharge
presents only part of the picture. With the increasing reluctance of
hospitals to admit residents, it is also necessary to ask where in the
community the mentally ill not being admitted to hospitals are being
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maintained. The increasing reluctance of state hospitals to admit patients
is most evident in the case of the elderly mentally ill. Between 1950 and
1975, the rate per 100,000 population of hospitalization of the elderly
mentally ill declined from 1149.7 to 241.9 (see Figure 4). Between 1962
and 1975, the rate per 100,000 population of first admissions to state
hospitals declined from 163.7 to 36.7 for the elderly. For all ages the
3
comparable decline was only 70.6 to 57.1. In 1977, only 76,900 (5.9%)
of 1,303,100 nursing home residents in the United States were known to have
been admitted to their current setting directly from a state mental hos-
pital. At the time of their last medical examination, however, 266,100
of the residents, or 20.4%, had a primary diagnosis of some form of mental
disorder.5 The number of persons with chronic mental conditions was even
higher: 324,700 (24.9%) suffered from chronic brain syndrome alone. 6
Between 1963 and 1969, the total number of nursing home residents with men-
tal disorders increased from 221,721 to 426,712. The majority of these
were elderly: 187,675 in 1963, 367,586 in 1969. During the same period,
the number of elderly residents in state hospitals declined from 148,842
to 111, 420. The General Accounting Office concluded, in 1977, that
nursing homes are the largest single place of care for the
mentally ill. They represent 29.3 percent, or $4.2 billion,
of the estimated total direct care costs fot the mentally
ill of $14.5 billion in 1974. In contrast, State, county,
and other public mental hospitals accounted for 22.8 percent
of the total direct care costs.8
Finally, it should be noted that nursing homes have been used more
frequently to care for the long-hospitalized chronically ill than for the
revolving-door population. The revolving-door population tends to have
infrequent, but severe, psychiatric episodes which nursing homes are
- 43 -
Figure 4. Resident patient rate per 100,000 population of persons 65 years
of age or older, state and county mental hospitals, United
States, 1950-1975.
1,200
1,000
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Sources: Kenneth Minkoff, "A Map of Chronic Mental Patients," in The
Chronic Mental Patient: Problems, Solutions, and Recommendations
for a Public Policy, ed. John A. Talbott (Washington, D.C.:
American Psychiatric Association, 1978), p. 27; Laura Milazzo-
Sayre, Changes in the Age, Sex and Diagnostic Composition of
State and County Mental Hospitals, United States 1965-1975,"
Statistical Note No. 146 (Rockville, Md.: National Institute of
Mental Health, Biometry Branch, 1978), p. 4.
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generally unwilling to deal with. Thus, where nursing home beds are in
short supply -- as has been increasingly the case since the 1970s -- and
nursing homes have the freedom to select their residents, they tend to
choose to accept the more docile and predictable chronically ill. In ad-
dition, there is some evidence that the chronically ill placed in nursing
homes tend to become concentrated in a relatively small number of homes
which generally provide a low, essentially custodial, level of care.9
The revolving-door population is in turn pushed toward the even lower level
of care provided in board-and-care homes and similar settings.
2. Characteristics of Community Settings
Of all the major settings in which the mentally ill are maintained
in lieu of maintenance in state hospitals, none has the ideal features of
the transitional community residences envisioned by advocates of deinsti-
tutionalization. All of the settings have been criticized as inappropriate
for the mentally ill. Some of the major criticisms will be reviewed here.
a. Family Care
Of the community settings in which the mentally ill are commonly
maintained, the family home is perhaps the least objectionable. For many
acute patients, severe psychiatric problems are temporary and therefore
return to the family is entirely appropriate. For those with long-term
problems, however, family care can produce widely different outcomes, de-
pending on the characteristics of the family. In many cases, the atti-
tude of the family towards its mentally ill member can lead to the social
withdrawal of the patient and a consequent regression in his/her condition.10
This is all the more true because states provide few rehabilitative services
to the mentally ill once they are placed in family homes. Moreover, the
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presence of a mentally ill person in the household places a large burden
on families, albeit a burden which many families readily accept.11 Of
particular concern is evidence that the presence of a mentally ill person
in the home can create psychiatric and other problems among the formerly
healthy members of the family. On the basis of his review of literature
examining the effectiveness of care in the family, Arnhoff concludes that
there is considerable social cost in keeping the patient
on home treatment, . . . with no clear-cut therapeutic
advantage to the patient.IL
b. Nursing Homes
It is widely argued that nursing home care for the mentally ill is
no better than state hospital care. According to the General Accounting
Office, a nursing home can be as institutional as a state hospital in terms
of its "size, structured living environment and lack of privacy." 1 3 In
1977, 57.7% of nursing home beds were in facilities of more than 50 beds,
26.9% in facilities with more than 100 beds.14 Regulated through Medicaid
standards developed with the physically handicapped in mind, nursing homes
provide custodial skilled nursing care, but provide virtually no therapeu-
tic care which would permit mentally ill residents to improve their condi-
tion and so move on to a more independent living arrangement. Indeed,
Medicaid regulations prohibit reimbursement for nursing homes where more
than 50% of the residents have a primary diagnosis of mental illness.
Under the influence of regulations and court decisions, the care currently
provided to the mentally ill in state hospitals is probably more therapeu-
tic than that in nursing homes.
Few of the mentally ill admitted to nursing homes ever progress to
the point where they can be discharged to a less restrictive setting.
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Patients admitted to nursing homes directly from a state hospital have a
longer median length-of-stay in the nursing home than patients admitted
from any other prior living arrangements -- 1,299 days as compared to an
overall median of 597 days.15 In 1976, 34.7% of the 52,700 nursing home
discharges with a primary diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome were deaths. 1 6
Of the remainder, an indeterminate number were transferred to state hospi-
tals or other nursing homes.
Because of the institutional character and lack of therapy
of nursing homes, the reliance on nursing home placements to provide care
for the mentally ill in the community has commonly been termed "reinstitu-
tionalization" (or "transinstitutionalization") rather than "deinstitu-
tionalization."
c.Board-and-Care Homes
Subject to even greater criticism than nursing home placements
have been board-and-care home placements. Board-and-care homes provide
little beyond a place to live. These homes are often unlicensed, but are
heavily relied upon by state governments as a low-cost alternative for
placement for the mentally ill when nursing home beds are unavailable.
Reich and Siegel describe New York City's so-called proprietary homes as
follows:
Proprietary homes are privately run group homes for adults, some
as large as 285 beds. Clients residing in these facilities are
expected to be self-sufficient, require a minimum amount of care, take
their own medication and not disturb the other clients in any way.
This type of home was clearly never intended to be a residence for
the chronically mentally ill. Few of these homes have significant
day programs or rehabilitative services, and few provide a systematic
program of psychiatric care.
Several private entrepreneurs saw in the policies of the State
Department of Mental Hygiene an opportunity for financial gain. Under
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the facade of community service they refurbished unsuccessful old
hotels and motels and arranged with the state hospitals to accept any
patients the hospitals wished to discharge. The result is that many
of these proprietary homes have become unsupervised state hospitals.
Many of the patients were on high doses of tranquilizers, causing them
to be apathetic, disinterested, and unable to function on any level.
Young mental hospital dischargees became isolated in the homes be-
cause they were unable to relate to the average age of the other re-
sidents (over 65). Patients gathered in the lobby, gazing blankly
into space, rocking back and forth, staring at a televsion set which
has been turned off. If the clients deteriorated in the proprietary
homes, they were often turned out on the street when the state hospi-
tals did not readmit them.
Presently there are about 5,000 group proprietary home beds in New
York City, of which about 50 per cent are occupied by mental hospi-
tal dischargees. In some homes as many as 85 per cent of the patients
are from state hospitals, although the home is not specifically iden-
tified as being exclusively for the behalf of the mentally ill. 1 7
A 1979 investigative report on the private proprietary homes by the Deputy
Attorney General of New York State found pervasive
"unhealthy, unsanitary, and unsafe living conditions, poor nutrition,
failure to provide even minimal services and recreational programs,
deficiencies relating to medical care and the administration of medi-
cation and numerous violations of local building, fire and safety
codes."18
The boarding homes have proliferated because, with little supervi-
sion from state authorities, operators can care for patients in substan-
dard facilities and, consequently, profit considerably from the payments
they receive to cover room and board. According to a Beacon Hill Update
article, in Los Angeles
60 ex-mental patients "disappeared" one night from a boarding house.
The residents had been "sold" to another residential hotel for $83
apiece. The buyer made a good deal: His new tenants were worth up
to $300 a month in welfare checks.19
Indeed, state reinbursement schemes are often set up in such a way that
boarding home operators have no incentive to provide good care. In Hawaii,
for example,
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state payments to former patients residing in licensed board and care
homes are controlled by a point system in which each recipient is
evaluated in terms of disability and the payment his boarding or care
home operators are given is based upon this assessment. The more dis-
abled or disturbed the patient, the more money the boarding home oper-
ator receives. . . . [T]he boarding home operators . . . in fact may
receive a financial reward if the patient deteriorates. 2 0
One chain of boarding homes, called Beverly Enterprises,
started out in May, 1964, with three convalescent facilities. Today
it owns 63 board-and-care homes and sanitariums in the United States,
38 of those in California; 12 general hospitals; and various land
holdings. In 1972, its net revenue was $79.5 million, up $12 mil-
lion from the previous year.2 1
d. The Homeless
Some mentally ill persons do not even have the good fortune to live
in boarding homes. Because of the lack of low-cost housing and inadequate
discharge planning at state hospitals, these people find no place to live
at all and become "street people." Some find places to sleep and get
occasional meals by coming to shelters, such as the Pine Street Inn in
Boston and the Men's Shelter in the Bowery section of New York. On some
nights the shelters have no room either and homeless people are turned
away. According to Baxter and Hopper,
During the summer months, parks are resorted to -- even preferred to
the other choices.23
In the railroad station,
"At 11 P.M. the attendant goes off duty and women rise from separate
niches and head for the bathroom. There they disrobe and wash their
clothes and bodies. Depending on the length of the line at the hand
dryers, they wait to dry their clothes, put them in their bags or
wear them wet. One woman cleans and wraps her ulcerated legs with
paper towels every night.
"The most assertive claim toilet cubicles, line them with newspapers
for privacy and warmth and sleep curled round the basin. Once they
are taken, the rest sleep along the walls, one on a box directly be-
neath the hand dryer which she pushed for warm air. One of the women
regularly cleans the floors, sinks and toilets so that no traces of
their uncustomary use remains.2 4
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There are only 3,200 beds in public shelters in New York City while there
are 36,000 homeless persons.25 At least 5,200 of the 47,000 chronically
mentally disabled people living in New York outside hospitals are among
the homeless.2 6
The problem is aggravated by the resistance of the affluent to the
placement of mentally ill persons in their communities. This, together
with the general unavailability of low-cost housing, has in some cases led
to the ghettoization of the mentally ill in run-down neighborhoods:
In some cases mental patients have been place in the slums of our
major cities in such numbers that their presence could scarcely
remain unnoticed. This is the case in Uptown, an area of Chicage,
where residents now speak of the "geriatric ghetto," a reference
to the some 13,000 former mental patients that have been placed in
this area of the city.2 7
e. Summary
None of the major settings in which the mentally ill have been
housed outside of state hospitals---neither family homes, nursing homes,
nor board-and-care homes -- provide the type of transitional community re-
sidential care envisioned as part of the idea of deinstitutionalization.
State hospitals provide more therapeutic care than any of these alternatives.
Board-and-care homes have even come under criticism for the poor living
conditions they provide. A small but significant number of the mentally
ill have nowhere to live at all. This situation casts serious doubt upon
the value of maintenance in the community for the rehabilitation of the
mentally ill. As Baxter and Hopper put it,
it has long been recognized that pathologies of place compound disor-
ders of the mind. One study underway in Pittsburgh indicates that a-
mong ex-patients living in the community, the severity of roaches in
the home is a better predictor of re-hospitalization than the severity
of symptoms in the sensorium.2 8
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Nevertheless, placement in some community settings does increase the liberty
of the mentally ill. Baxter and Hopper quote the New York State Commis-
sioner of Mental Health:
"Hard though it may be to believe, however, many of the individuals
living in [boarding homes] are there by choice and state a preference
for remaining rather than returning to the hospital. If these indi-
viduals are prisoners, they are prisoners of poverty not of the men-
tal health system. Were SSI benefits adequate. Were jobs really
available. Were low income housing sufficient. Most of these indi-
viduals could live quite capably in community settings. While they
may be living in circumstances far less than ideal many of them pre-
fer those circumstances to a hospital environment.9
C. COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
The scarcity of therapeutic residential settings in the community
would in itself not be so objectionable if other mental health services
were available in the community. Acute patients would benefit from out-
patient treatment, while the transition of chronic patients would be aided
by programs providing them with day activities. Neither type of community
service has been effectively provided to the low-income severely mentally
ill. This is in part a reflection of the failure of the federal CMHC pro-
gram to fulfill some of its stated objectives, but it is also indicative
of a lack of alternative, state-provided mental health services in the
community.
1. The Role of CMHCs
The construction of CMHCs was justified largely on the basis of
their permitting the deinstitutionalization of the hospitalized mentally
disabled, They were to provide the community outpatient care and short-
term inpatient care which the discharged patients and possible future pa-
tients would require. CMHCs have not fulfilled their promise, however:
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they were slow to be constructed and tend not to serve the types of people
served by state hospitals. As Kirk and Therrien explain,
Although community mental health programs were established to supplant
the traditional state mental hospital, both their ideology and their
most common services are not directed at the needs of those who have
traditionally resided in state psychiatric institutions. The ideology
of community mental health has been primarily concerned with primary
prevention, the importance of early diagnosis and treatment, consulta-
tion, social action, crisis intervention, short-term outpatient care,
and time-limited, brief, inpatient care. Preferred target populations
for such services are clearly normal populations who are at risk, per-
sons with mild, acute, treatable disorders, who can be handled in of-
fice practice, or severely disordered persons suffering from their
first psychiatric crisis. Community mental health programs do, of
course, have services for other patient populations, specifically for
patients with a long history of severe psychiatric disorder, but these
programs are not meant to constitute the core of community mental
health practice and are usually the least prestigious of the services
offered, have the fewest and least trained staff, and are often viewed
as undesirable but necessary services. 3 0
According to Chu and Trotter, the Community Mental Health Centers
Act has simply helped to perpetuate a two-class system of health care, in
which those who can afford to pay for private services get adequate care,
while those who cannot are served by the system of state institutions.
They contend that aspects of the CMHC regulations have in many instances
been interpreted "as open invitation to psychiatrists to expand their
31
private practices." For example, the Metropolitan Community Mental
Health Center in Minneapolis, co-sponsored by two private hospitals and
built with CMHC funds,
has nearly twice as many psychiatric beds as any other single hospi-
tal in the area. . . . The large majority of the patients . . . are
referred to the center by private psychiatrists. The most recent
statistics show that in the month of May, 1972, out of a total number
of 168 patients admitted to the inpatient service, 100 were referred
by private psychiatrists and an additional 5 by nonpsychiatric physi-
cians. In contrast, 8 patients were referred by the county welfare
department, 3 by the state employment agency, and 1 by the nearby
Anoka State Hospital. There is no evidence that the center has esta-
blished any working relationship with the state hospital, much less
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had an impact on the admissions to the state hospital from its catch-
ment area. The NIMH site-visit report state that the center has "no
linkage with the state hospital for people from the service area."
The site-visit further notes that many patients from the catchment
area who initially contact the County General Hospital "are never
offered alternative service at Metro, but are routinely transferred to
Anoka." The report concludes, "This practice defeats the essential
philosophic treatment concept of the Center program. Instead of chang-
the patient flow away from state hospitals and inpatient service, the
emergency componentsupports the traditional status-quo of service
delivery."
According to its director, it is the clear policy of the Metro-
politan center to refuse to admit indigent patients for inpatient
care. . . .
The service the Metropolitan Center most frequently provides to
indigents is outpatient service. The extent of this "service" to the
poor throughout most of the operation of the center is indicated by
the statistic that as recently as February, 1970, the center was seeing
a total of five outpatients per month! . . .
According to NIMH regional office official Martin Keeley, the top
staff at the Metropolitan Center were never interested in treating the
indigent. Keeley stated that the psychiatrists "focused all their
attention on the construction grant." Now that the building is finished,
Keeley believes that the regional office has little leverage over what
kind of services the center provides and to whom.32
While most CMHCs have better records than the Metropolitan Center in pro-
viding services to their catchment area populations, the lack of sources
of funding for the care of indigent patients has severely limited the po-
tential of CMHCs to help those mentally ill unable to pay for their own
care.
2. Other Community Mental Health Services
As CMHCs failed to satisfy the needs of the mentally ill at risk of
hospitalization in the community, the responsibility for providing com-
munity mental health services fell to state mental health departments.
States were, however, more interested in realizing the monetary savings of
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depopulating institutions than in providing the necessary alternative com-
munity services. In New York, for example, discharge planning
is widely recognized to be "a joke," according to one member of the
Quality of Care Commission for [New York state's] mental health sys-
tem. Discharge planning, in most cases, amounts to giving the soon-
to-be ex-patient the address of the Department of Social Services and
a subway token to get there. 3 3
As state mental health agencies have failed to assume the respon-
sibility of providing for the service needs of their clients in the com-
munity, these responsibilities have shifted to other agencies. For exam-
ple, many of the discharged patients have rapidly become entangled in the
criminal justice system. In Los Angeles County, in the year after the
California legislature passed a law encouraging release of mental patients
from state hospitals, "the number of arrests followed by incompetent-to-
stand-trial pleas rose by 100%."34 A Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health study found in a survey of county corrections facilities that
one of every six admissions had at some time been in a state hos-
pital, Community Mental Health Center, or community residence.3 5
While the criminal justice system has been forced to assume some
of the responsibility for discharged patients, the welfare system has been
required to accept the primary burden. Welfare departments are generally
responsible for the income security programs which provide the mentally ill
with their incomes. Welfare agencies are also frequently responsible for
providing services, including psychiatric care in the community and shel-
ter. In the assessment of Gruenberg and Archer, the abandonment of the
mentally ill is a consequence of the way in which responsibility has been
transferred from mental health to public welfare agencies:
The deinstitutionalization policies leading to dramatic reductions in
state mental health censuses of the 1970s can be seen as a rapid
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acceleration of a trend to transfer financial responsibility for the
chronically mentally ill patient from state mental health departments
to the social welfare system. The present crisis of abandonment of
the seriously mentally ill has arisen because no similar transfer of
responsibility for their care and treatment has taken place. The ero-
sion of state mental hospital responsibility has created a situation
in which psychiatry's most helpless patients have no recourse against
a general tendency of all medical services to reject their most unre-
warding patients. While the seriously mentally ill are a visisble pro-
blem causing much public concern, the tendency has been to advocate
solutions which are somebody else's responsibility to execute. Social
welfare departments are not equipped to provide the psychiatric atten-
tion that many of these patients need on a continuing basis3 6
Kirk and Therrien describe how, in Hawaii, the diffusion of respon-
sibility between state agencies has worked to the detriment of ex-patients:
[A] source of conflict between the welfare and the psychiatric agencies
in Hawaii is the "point system," by which the welfare department asses-
ses the needs of former patients residing in boarding homes. . . .
[T]he welfare department assesses each patient who resides in one of
its licensed boarding homes; residents of unlicensed homes receive a
substantially lower flat rate. The organizational conflict develops
because the welfare department wants to keep expenditures as low as
possible and tends to under-assess the disabilities of former psychia-
tric patients, while mental health personnel push for higher payments
to boarding home operators, assuming that it will lead to better pa-
tient care. But . . . boarding home operators are given no incentive
by either the welfare or the mental health department to help patients
become more independent. Thus, the transfer of responsibility for
patients from the state hospital to other community agencies has re-
sulted not in greater continuity of care but rather in greater inter-
organizational conflict.37
The lack of willingness on the part of any agency to assume primary
responsibility for those in need of services has been of tremendous conse-
quence in the case of the mentally ill, because of the very nature of their
disorders. In this respect, Whitmer's description of a typical ex-mental
patient is especially telling:
[T]he discharge patient who is most in need of [outpatient psychiatric]
services, but least able to secure them for himself, is the first pa-
tient to be lost. He is most likely the person who forgets his ap-
pointment time or forgets the person he is to see. Arriving at a
clinic, he is easily discouraged by a receptionist who refers him on
to a clinic closer to his neighborhood, or tells him that intake hours
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are over, or that the physician is not in to prescribe medication on
that day. If he finds his way to the waiting room, he usually does
not have the minimum freedom from anxiety or unreasonable fears to sit
with strangers. If he stays, he might become angry, paranoid and
threatening to the staff. By his behavior, he indicates his need for
treatment, but he is never the one to say, "I am in some distress, can
you help?" Staff members often feel resentful and frightened. When
he leaves, he is the patient who may never be seen again until admitted
to an inpatient service.
He is also the person who never initiates outpatient contacts. He
discontinues his medication, believing it to be the source of all his
problems, citing as evidence his experience of uncomfortable side ef-
fects. He spends whatever he received from an income maintenance pro-
gram in the first few days of the month, giving it to friends or
spending it to self-medicate himself against anxiety with street drugs
or alcohol. He will not live in any kind of residential care because
the programs take too much of his income, threaten him with pernicious
control over his long-disputed autonomy, and deprive him of the pro-
tection of social withdrawal allowed him in an isolated hotel room.3 8
Thus, the lack of clear responsibility for provision of community services,
combined with the expense and difficulty of serving the mentally ill in the
community, has permitted the majority of the mentally ill in the community
to "fall through the cracks" and receive no services at all until they
require reinstitutionalization, either in a state mental health hospital
or, increasingly often, in jail.
D. COMMUNITY VS. INSTITUTIONAL CARE
Professional opinion, for the most part, still favors community
care over institutional care. The individual successes in well-run
halfway houses are, however, overshadowed by the glaring inadequacy of
community services. In concluding their comprehensive review of outcome
studies on deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients, Braun and his
colleagues write that, with many qualifications,
the available studies of alternatives to [hospital] admission and of
modifications of conventional hospitalization . . . describe results
with respect to psychiatric status that are as good as, and in some
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instances superior to, those observed with hospital management of
control patients.39
However, they found only two controlled studies of patients discharged
after prolonged stays in mental hospitals, which led them to criticize
the widespread release of such patients into the community:
The failure to have evaluated adequately the effect of discharging
hundreds of thousands of chronically ill patients from large public
mental hospitals has been a major defect in the conduct of public
policy. As judged by the large numbers of anecdotal reports and
newspaper essays on deinstitutionalization, the outcomes for hundreds
of thousands of chronically ill mental hospital patients discharged
to the community without the benefit of adequate services was likely
worse than those expected with continued hospitalization.
The results of controlled studies, however favorable they
might appear, can clearly not be used to justify the wholesale dis-
charge of patients from large public mental hospitals to the commu-
nity without provision of adequate care. That pattern of deinstitu-
tionalization has been prevalent in many states. Regrettably, dein-
stitutionalization as it has been carried out on a large public scale
may on balance have been harmful to long-term mental hospital
patients. 4 0
Even this conclusion does not address a fundamental point: the
focus on the location of care -- community as opposed to institution --
ignores a more basic question. What is the quality of care provided in
a given setting, relative to the quality of care it is possible to pro-
vide in such a setting? The institutionalization of the mentally ill in
private institutions has produced little public outrage, while nursing
homes in the community are very much like state hospitals. As Arnhoff
puts it:
the detrimental effects of institutionalization that are currently
being expounded are not necessarily a function of institutionaliza-
tion per se; they appear to exist in interaction with the quality of
institution and the type of patient . . . Institutionalization . . .
is not a unique characteristic of mental institutions but rather is a
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possible and probable consequence in any setting characterized by
neglect and depersonalization. The current policy of a large segment
of the mental health professions, the National Institute of Mental
Health, and the lay lobby organizations, that institutionalization is
detrimental and the public institutions should be phased out over the
shortest span of time possible, is based upon the logical fallacy
that since bad hospitals are bad for patients, any hospitalization is
bad for patients and should be avoided entirely or made as short as
possible. Reinforcement for this position is provided by
the most limited type of cost accounting and administrative statis-
tics, from which it is fallaciously concluded that economies will be
realized by such policies. Thus it is made to appear that humanita-
rian ends can be achieved at lower cost, an outcome that has obvious
popular appeal. . . . [T]his policy will eventually lead to the need
to rediscover the public institution . . ., since there unfortunately
remain large numbers of chronic psychotics who are unable to exist
outside an institutional setting.
The inescapable reality is that good care for the mentally ill,
whether in state hospitals or in alternate settings, would require much
larger expenditures than have been made. The problem is described well by
Borus, who writes that, in recent years,
mental-health professionals have learned much about the clinical care
of the chronically mentally ill in the community. Innovative model
programs . . . have demonstrated that with discriminate evaluation of
the strengths and needs of the individual patient, adequate resources,
designated responsibility for care, long-term provision of services,
professional flexibility, and public support, many patients can lead
reasonable lives outside institutions.
The limited ability to generalize and reproduce these model pro-
grams nationwide is in large part due to the public's enduring unwill-
ingness to pay for high-quality care for the mentally ill. The custo-
dial-level funding that politicians allocated to state hospitals over
the years accurately reflected this limited public support; deinsti-
tutionalization has shown that without sufficient resources, simply
changing the locus of bad care will not create good care. Since pro-
vision of the many high-quality treatment alternatives that the
severely ill require is an expensive proposition, it is even less 42
likely to receive broad support in these times of fiscal restraint.
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V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PROVISION IN MASSACHUSETTS SINCE 1950
In order to appreciate the extent to which the depopulation of
institutions had been motivated by many forces -- fiscal pressures, tech-
nological change, changing social policy and court decisions -- it is nec-
essary to examine how an individual state transformed its mental health
system. The policy decisions regarding the specifics of mental health
care provision are, after all, made at the state level, so it is at
this level where the many forces affecting mental health care come together.
This chapter therefore reviews the history of public mental health care
in one state, Massachusetts, over the past thirty years.
Massachusetts is a good state in which to examine the process
through which the pattern of public mental health services has changed,
because it was one of the first states to begin depopulating its institu-
tions. The number of residents in Massachusetts state hospitals had de-
creased from a peak of 22,798 in 1953 to 1,965 in 1981 (see Figure 5).
Three state hospitals have been closed since 1973, leaving eight.
More recently, the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (DMH)
has been rapidly developing community based mental health services. In
FY 1976, DMH spent 34% of its budget providing community based services.
By FY 1981, this percentage had increased to more than 65% of a budget
almost twice as large. 1,2 The transformation led the Washington Post to
report in 1980 that "Massachusetts is now the best hope of mental health
reformers."3
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Figure 5. Number of Residents in State Mental Hospitals, Massachusetts,
1953-1981.
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setts Senate, Ways and Means Committee, Budget Recommendations:
Fiscal Year 1981 (Boston: 1980, p. 21-1; Massachusetts Senate
Ways and Means Committee, Budget Recommendations: Fiscal Year
1982 (Boston: 1981), p. 21-1.
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If one attempts to interpret the transformation of mental health
care in Massachusetts simply as an implementation of the deinstitutionali-
zation idea, it is difficult to understand why the first meaningful
development of transitional community residences lagged twenty years behind
the beginning of the trend to depopulate state institutions. When the
individual effects of the forces acting upon the state are examined,
however, the lag is easily understood. The initial depopulation was
motivated by the overcrowding in the underfinanced institutions and facil-
itated by the introduction of psychoactive drugs. The state was not
compelled to create community residences until the courts required it
in the 1970s.
Depopulation of institutions began with changing administrative
policies in state institutions in the early 1950s. Worcester State
Hospital was one of the first institutions in the United States to ex-
perience a decline in its resident population, with the number of res-
idents decreasing from 2,858 in 1950 to 2,693 in 1955. This was a period
in which the idea of community mental health was beginning to rise in
popularity, but Morrissey and Goldman suggest that much of the change in
policy can be explained by the fiscal pressures on the hospital. They
write that the hospital superintendent's
plan to reduce the hospital's census was based on pragmatic con-
siderations. Staff shortages and overcrowded wards made reduction
of the chronic caseload the only way the hospital could begin to
offer a semblance of humane care and active treatment . . . In a short
time . . . it became clear that the climate of opinion in the community
was becoming more tolerant [toward mentally ill people living in
the community]. The initial successes fueled the zeal of the staff
and the release program was stepped up as fast as family and other
placements could be found.5
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State hospital censuses were soon dropping across the state, but
the extent to which released patients benefitted from the policy is open
to debate. There were certainly very few community mental health services
in existence during this period. On the other hand, many of the released
persons were probably inappropriately institutionalized to begin with.
The state hospitals were, after all, service providers of the last resort,
taking in people who had diverse problems. As Morrissey and Goldman put
it for Worcester State, "The hospital had assumed responsibility for
the residual welfare and psychiatric needs of the community." 6 Thus, it
may well be that relatively few of the individuals discharged during the
1950s required community services. The obvious benefit of the depopulation,
however, accrued to the acute mental patients who received better service
when the hospitals ridded themselves of the burden of caring for chronic
patients. It was also during this period that psychoactive drugs gave
psychiatrists the power to control the disruptive behavior of patients.
Consequently, it can be argued that, for the first time in a century, the
hospitals were again able to treat some of these acutely ill individuals
quickly and send them back to the community before their condition dete-
riorated in the institutional environment.
The first real impetus for the development of community-based
services only came in 1963, with the passage of the federal CMHC legislation.
The federal legislation had two interrelated effects on Massachusetts:
first, it stimulated statewide mental health planning and thereby pre-
cipitated a reorganization of DMH; and, second, it encouraged the use of
the CMHC as a locus of treatment.
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With the federal funds which were available for comprehensive
mental health planning, the state created the Massachusetts Mental Health
Planning Project. The project produced a report entitled Mental Health
for Massachusetts in 1965. Acting on the recommendations in the report,
the Massachusetts legislature passed the Comprehensive Mental Health and
Retardation Act of 1966, Chapter 735 of the Massachusetts General Laws.
The federal provisions for the construction of CMHCs, however, by-
passed the state level of government, leaving open the possibility that
local governments and private organizations could request funds. State
officials obviously wished to incorporate any new facilities into the DMH
system, however, as evidenced by the provisions of the 1966 Massachusetts
law. The primary effect of the 1966 law was to divide Massachusetts into
37 catchment areas for the provision of mental health services. This
was a strong reflection of the federal preoccupation with the CMHC, in
that it was assumed in the federal legislation that each CMHC would serve
such a catchment area. Thus, the state legislation's primary importance
was to create the administrative changes -- the creation of area citizen
boards, provision for the appointment of area directors, grouping of the
areas into administrative regions -- which would permit the state to
capitalize on the availability of federal funds for CMHCs. It is not
that the Planning project ignored the need for community services other
than CMHCs -- Mental Health for Massachusetts mentions, for example,
ex-patient clubs. halfway houses and aftercare clinics -- but the report
seems to suggest that a community-based mental health service system is
essentially a system of CMHCs.
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Whether the Planning Project actually believed that mental health
care in Massachusetts would be transformed completely through the construc-
tion of CMHCs or whether the emphasis on CMHCs was simply a consequence
of the availability of federal funding, the number of CMHCs in Massachusetts
increased from 2 in 1967 to 15 in 1972.8 Given that CMHCs are a very
expensive proposition, this growth dwarfs the importance of growth
in other types of community programs over that same period. Indeed, former
DMH commissioner Robert Okin describes the effect of the Massachusetts
legislation on the growth of community programs as rather insignificant:
While [the] legislation set forth the framework for the development
of a community based delivery system, nothing in this Act guaranteed
the community services it described so eloquently. Nothing in [the]
statute committed significant resources to establish community ser-
vices. The statute enabled. It did not commit. It was a statement
of intent, not action. The result was that for years after its enact-
ment, with some exceptions, there was only infinitesimal movement in
our state to develop a network of community-based services. 9
In fact, the growth in the number of CMHCs may represent a game
of semantics. Among the first CMHCs to be created in Massachusetts were
none other than the same state hospitals which the CMHC legislation was
intended to replace. The logic of such conversions was that each hospital
was located in an area which would require a CMHC anyway. If the hospitals
were going to be phased down, why not take a part of each one and make it
into a CMHC? Of course, the hospitals were in such poor physical condition
that any funds that could be had to upgrade them were certainly welcome.
A similar logic was used to create other CMHCs as well. For
example, the Massachusetts Mental Health Center, which had long functioned
as the teaching mental health clinic of Harvard Medical School, was one of
the first Massachusetts CMHCs. Similarly, psychiatric units in community
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general hospitals were converted to CMHCs.10
Whether these new CMHCs served the population discharged from
the state hospitals is yet another question. The then commissioner of
DMH, Milton Greenblatt, writes that, during the period 1967-1972,
The overall number of patiients cared for in the system rose dramati-
cally as the result of the multiplication of community facilities,
from approximately 25,000 per year to well over 70,000 per year.ll
Given the poor reputation of CMHCs nationally in serving the needs of the
indigent mentally disabled, however, and knowing that Massachusetts Mental
Health Center, for example, has traditionally served an affluent population,
it appears likely that many of the newly served clients were not necessarily
the most needy.
Nevertheless, during this period the number of institutionalized
mentally disabled continued to decline. Where, then did the released
individuals go? It appears that, in Massachusetts as elsewhere, the
availability of federal Medicaid funds prompted hospital superintendents
to discharge their residents to nursing homes. 1 2 One study
of a 10 percent sample of patients discharged from Boston State
Hospital to the community over a three-year period [1965-1968]
revealed that a little more that half were discharged to super-
vised residential facilities (mostly nursing and rest homes),
while a little less than half were discharged to independent
living arrangements (with families or alone) or to a semi-indepen-
dent setting (foster or day care). Whether a patient was likely
to be discharged to independent living or to a nursing or rest home
related especially to two factors: age and length of stay in the
hospital. Significantly more patients below age 60 returned to
independent or semi-independent living. Those who had been in the
institution for more than five years were more likely to be dis-
charged to a supervised residential setting. Younger, more re-
cently hospitalized individuals had the best chance of resuming
community living while older, longer staying people were frequently
transferred to nursing or rest homes. 1 3
The use of nursing homes continued through the 1970s. In 1978, of 48,314
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residents in Massachusetts nursing and rest homes, 3,676 (7,6%) had been
admitted directly form a state mental hospital. An additional 11,731
(24.3%) of the residents were mentally ill, were mentally retarded and/or
had behavior problems. The mentally disabled tended, moreover, to be con-
centrated in the homes providing relatively low levels of care.1 4
The use of nursing homes has already been questioned above,
insofar as the nursing home environment can be considered as institutional
as a state hospital or state school environment. The U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, however, goes farther than merely suggesting that an in-
ordinate number of mentally disabled individuals have been placed in
nursing homes. The Office provides statistics that show that a large
number of residents of Massachusetts institutions have become concentrated
in some of the worst nursing homes in the state. Moreover, a Massachusetts
official told the Office
that there was a general tendency to place formerly institution-
alized persons in those nursing homes where the quality of care was
poorer and safety standards not complied with as rigidly as in other
nursing homes. He said that, generally speaking, the more ex-mental
patients there were in a facility, the worse the conditions. 1 5
Returning to the late 1960s, however, the administration of DMH
was not at all organized in a manner that would permit it to deal with
the needs of discharged patients. Area director positions went unfilled.
Where there were administrators fulfilling area director functions, their
responsibilities were limited to overseeing a system of community services
which hardly existed. Responsibility for institutionalized persons rested
with superintendents of hospitals which served an entire region (made up
of several areas). Thus, once a person left an institution, responsibility
for the care of that person shifted from a hospital superintendent to
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an area administrator, The DM administration saw the insitutional-com-
munity division of responsibility as a problem in providing the continuity
of care needed by clients and sought to improve the situation through the
introduction of unitization.
"Unitization" referred to the separation of each regional hos-
pital into units serving the clients from each respective area in the
region. The area director would be responsible for all services pro-
vided to people from his/her area, including the services provided within
the area unit in the hopital. According to David Myerson,superintendent
of Worcester State Hospital during its unitization in 1970, the admini-
strative change did not significantly alter the operation of the hospital,1 6
although it can perhaps be argued that the change was required for the
later development of community programs to be feasible.
The development of community-based programs was still not a realistic
possibility, however, because too much of the state's resources were tied
up in maintaining the institutional system. Myerson describes the dilemma:
[S]hould the Steward request $50.000 from the legislature to prepare
a leaking roof, or for more social workers, or for funds to purchase
a community-based residence? As long as patients reside in the hos-
pital, the leaking roof must be repaired. Given the severely limited
budget, as well as inflation, it was difficult to pry money from the
[Worcester State Hospital] budget to establish community programs.
The care of the building locked even progreygive administrators into
perpetuating this old institutional system.
Many of the institution's expenses were indivisible, so that the decreases
in institutional censuses did not produce proportionate savings. For
example, the costs of maintaining the grounds of an institution remained
constant regardless of the number of residents there. It was becoming
increasingly clear that monetary savings from decreasing institutional
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populations would be realized only if some institutions could be closed
down entirely.
In spite of the hospital's policy of early discharge of patients,
the number of people in institutions would not fall as quickly as the
administrators hoped. This was due in large measure to the fact that,
irrespective of the changes in treatment philosophy within the mental
health field, the general community still regarded the mental institution
as a place of last resort to send socially undesirable people. Myerson
writes that he
soon learned that, as Superintendent, I was expected to follow the
tradition of all my predecessors, namely to accept any mentally ill
or even socially incapacitated person whose admission was requested
by any community agency. An old man, for example, might break his
hip and be hospitalized for his surgical procedures in one of the
local general hospitals. Following the surgical procedure, he would
need a long convalescence; but local nursing home beds were unavail-
able. If he exhibited confusion or disturbing behavior patterns during
his postoperative care, the administrator of the local general hospital
could charge him with a minor violation (like disturbing the peace).
Two psychiatrists, not connected with [Worcester State Hospital],
could then recommend to the district court judge that the patient be
sent to [Worcester State] on a 30-day commitment. As a rule, the judge
followed this recommendation and ordered the old patient transferred
to [Worcester State]. Since this procedure only happend to older men
and women without families and money, this 30-day observation was, in
effect, a permanent commitment to the state hospital, for at that time
there was no other place to send them. I once complained to the dis-
trict court judge, who condoned this transfer on the basis that it
cost four times as much to hold the old person in a general hospital
than it did in the state hospital
It was not unusual for physicians from general hospitals to refer
patients even from Intensive Care Units if they were obstreperous or
assaultive. The fact that the state hospital had limited medical
facilities was never raised as an issue. . . .
The district courts, too, believed that the state hospital was
mandated to accept whomever the judge decided to send. Consequently,
[Worcester State] received arsonsists, exhibitionists, alcoholics, and 18
drug users, as well as psychotic people who were detained by the police
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This situation changed somewhat in 1971, when the state Mental
Health Reform Act went into effect. The act was similar to many laws
passed in other states during the same time period in order to limit the
states' ability to involuntarily commit individuals to mental institutions.
States needed to pass such laws for fear that federal courts would find
existing commitment statutes unconstitutionally vague. One of the most
important effects of the law, however, was to give superintendents the
power to limit admissions to hospitals.
The revised statutes encouraged voluntary admission and prohibited
involuntary admission to the hospital except when patients were proven
to be physically dangerous to themselves or to others. Only a qualified
physician was allowed to determine this degree of dangerousness and
mandate an admission to the hospital. One of the crucial features
of this law was that it gave the Superintendent the authority to deter-
mine who would be accepted as a qualified physician and to withdraw
this privilege if the community physician made inappropriate referals.
For the first time, the Superintendent had some authority to control
admissions. The law even made psychiatric screening necessary before
a judge could mandate the admission of a patient from his court.
This law helped the state hospital administration. At least the
general hospital and other community agencies could no longer commit
at will the nuisances, the harmless senile people, or the obstreperous
alcoholics.19
The Massachusetts Mental Health Hospital Planning Project concluded that
the act was
more directly responsible than any other factor for the accelerated
census decline evident in our state hospitals during [the years 1971-
1973]. . . . The legislation has strikingly decreased the proportion
of involuntary admissions to our state hospitals. In 1970 such ad-
missions represented 76 percent of the cases opened in institutions;
in the Act's first 12 months (effective date November 1, 1971), the
proportion of involuntary admissions was down to 27 percent. Pro-
longed involuntary civil commitments were down from 811 in fiscal
year 1971 to 325 in the first 12 months after [the legislation] became
effective.
Not only has there been a shift in the proportion of involuntary
to voluntary commitments, the Reform Act also has tended to reduce the
absolute number of admissions to state hospitals. Because of the
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legislation's more stringent requirements for admissions, mental
health personnel throughout the state have demonstrated an increasing
reluctance to admit patients, even on a voluntary basis, unless there
are compelling reasons to do so. There also has been a 50% reduction
in the number of pre-trial court commitments to mental hospitals as a
consequence of the 1970 Act. The number of such admissions dropped
from 1,888 in fiscal year 1971 to 944 in [the law's] first year
since many more pre-trial psychiatric evaluations are now performed
in the district court clinics operated by the Department of Mental
Health.20
As the number of institutionalized individuals continued to drop,
it finally became feasible for DMH to begin to close institutions, which
it did, beginning with Grafton State Hospital in 1973. By this time,
the incentive to close institutions was even greater, because a number
of factors were threatening to make the costs of institutionalization sky-
rocket at an unprecedented rate.
In part, costs were increasing because of the deinstitutionalization
process itself. As the institutions rid themselves of the residents who
appeared most likely to be able to function successfully in the community,
they were unavoidably left with the residents who required the most attention
and, consequently, the most resources. In addition, the institutions had
traditionally relied on the labor of residents to help run the institutions.
With the most productive of these residents now in the community, insti-
tutional employees had to do more themselves. Moreover, there was pressure
not to use any residents for work at the institutions unless that work was
clearly therapeutic, and even then only if those residents were paid wages.
DMH was therefore unable to lay off employees as institutional populations
decreased. The consequence of this was that the per patient costs of in-
stitutional care rose rapidly and the total costs of operating any given
institution did not drop.
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The incentive of 50% federal reimbursement under Medicaid en-
couraged DMH to invest heavily in the physical upgrading of institutions.
Between FY 1970 and FY 1980, the annual cost of caring for a client at
Worcester State Hospital increased from $8,909 to $31,900; at Danvers State
Hospital the increase was from $4,951 to $37,802. During the same period,
federal reimbursement under Medicaid increased from $1,475,306 to $82,576,521,
although much of this went to state schools for the retarded.
2 1
Another force pushing up the cost of institutional care was the
threat of lawsuits. DMH was first subjected to litigation in its provision
of mentally retardation services, when a lawsuit, Ricci v Greenblatt,
was filed on behalf of Belchertown State School residents. The suit al-
leged that the constitutional rights of the mentally retarded citizens
of the school were being violated because the school was an unhealthy,
unsafe living environment. The state entered into a consent decree with
the plaintiffs. This obliged the state to substantially improve condi-
tions at the school. The immediate effect of the consent decree was to
commit the state to an expensive, long-term upgrading of the Belchertown
State School under the scrutiny of the court. The ultimate effect of the
decree was much greater, however, because the success of the plaintiffs
in the first action encouraged advocates to file suits against four more
state schools, with each suit leading to another consent decree. The later
decrees dealt not only with the quality of institutional care, but also
with the rights of residents to receive care in less restrictive settings.
When the court identified the low quality and high turnover of staff as a
problem in providing adequate care to residents of the school, the state
also entered into a personnel decree in 1978. The personnel decree covered
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all five of the schools and resulted, among other things, in the upgrading
of the salaries of direct care staff in the schools. 2 2
Thus, there were a number of important factors prompting the state
to invest heavily in institutional care for the mentally disabled. It
would be wrong, however, to equate this observation with the conclusion
that the state became, as a consequence of putting more resources in its
institutions, amy more positively disposed toward institutional care of
the mentally ill. If anything, the reverse was true. Compliance with
federal standards, for example, required not only the upgrading of physi-
cal facilities in institutions, but also larger programmatic expenditures
to care for the institutionalized. Even when institutions were certified
for Medicaid reimbursement, it was still cheaper for the state to care
for a Medicaid eligible client in a Medicaid reimbursable nursing home
than in a state institution.
This became doubly true with the advent of the consent decrees.
Greenblatt's description of the state administration's thought process in
response to the filing of Ricci v. Greenblatt is instructive:
[A] highly significant meeting between the governor's staff, repre-
sentatives of the human services secretariat, and mental health
adminsitrators took place. . . .After much debate, it appeared the
effective choices were defined: (1) a program that would upgrade
both treatment programs and physical plants as soon as possible for
all residents in the schools, while continuing to develop community
alternatives for those who did not belong in institutions or (2) a
slow but vigorous four- to five-year effort concentrated entirely on
reducing population through community placements. In the second plan,
by holding institutional staff complements constant, within four to
five years the minimal staff-patient ratios required by standard-setting
agencies would be reached. As for the physical plant, the proposal
was to repair only those buildings to be occupied after the four- to
five-year period of population reduction. Everything would be neglected,
save emergency repairs and renovations in any other buildings used
during the reduction period.
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In making this hard choice -- one that faces any state with
limited resources and that will eventually face the whole nation --
the second alternative was favored, namely, to invest in community
alternatives essentially and, by expanding community resources, to
depopulate the institutions as fast as possible. Much as it
might be regretted, the governor ruled that the state could not
afford to do everything. It could not renovate plants, add
needed personnel, and create new community alternatives all at
the same time. Thus, in this very hard decision, it was clear
that literally thousands of persons in our state instititions
would continue for many more months to receive the kind of care
and treatment that everyone agreed was far from humane. One
could take little solace in the fact that this situation would
be gradually resolved over four to five years. It was a sad
victory of fiscal realities over human needs. 2 3
As it turned out, a new judge was assigned to the case after this
meeting and took a harder line. The state administration was conse-
quently compelled by the decree to invest heavily in upgrading insti-
tutional services as well as expanding community services. 2 4 The
consent decree therefore had the effect of making the DMH budget grow
more quickly than it otherwise would have. Indeed, there were probably
many people within the DMH administration who saw the decree as a
blessing, compelling legislators to appropriate to the department
funds which they would have preferred not to spend at all.
The expansion of the DMH budget was stopped with a vengeance,
however, in 1975, when Michael Dukakis, who was then governor of Massa-
chusetts, froze $26 million of already appropriated human services funds.
New community programs were started up late or not at all, while the
state schools and hospitals were unable to fill staff vacancies. Given
the high rate of turnover in the underpaid mental health aide positions,
staffing levels in the institutions fell rapidly. Conditions in the
institutions worsened noticeably. In particular, overworked direct
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care staff in the institutions relied increasingly on seclusion and
restraint of residents in order to maintain order in the institutions. 2 5
Conditions in the mental health system began to change only
after the freeze was lifted. At this point, the impetus for expansion
came again from a lawsuit, with yet another consent decree, this time
concerning Northampton State Hospital. The Northampton decree ad-
dressed the rights of the mentally ill to be treated in the "least
restrictive environment." Under the decree the state consented to
providing services to mentally ill persons in community residence
programs not as confining as state hospitals wherever feasible. The
decree also specified the quality of community services to be provided,
thereby preventing "dumping" of patients into programs of no therapeutic
value. As a result, the decree did not require major upgrading of the
facilities at the hospital. The decree did, however, require the
establishment of a comprehensive system of mental health care in the
community. Thus, DM was finally propelled, willingly or unwillingly,
into a major expansion of community-based services to the mentally ill.
A major portion of the expansion occurred, naturally, in Region I,
in the westernmost part of the state -- the region served by Northampton
State. The consent decree was signed in 1978. In FY 1979, the region
spent $6,534,000 purchasing community-based services by contracts. By
FY 1981, that amount had tripled, to $21,505,000 .26 Indeed, it is
clear that the courts had an enormous effect on the region's budget,
as Belchertown State School was the regional state school. Under the
influence of both decrees, the total regional budget increased from
$11,711,026 in FY 1975 to $28,378,606 in FY 1981 .27
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The lesson of the decree was not lost on the state administra-
tion. If the legislature wished to retain any control whatsoever
over the DMH system, it was imperative that the most egregious problems
with the system be eliminated before yet another action was brought
against the state. DMH therefore moved quickly to create community-
based programs not only in Region I, but across the entire state.
In FY 1976, DMH spent 34% of its budget on community programs. In
FY 1981, it spent 65% of its budget on such programs.28 Moreover, the
FY 1981 DMH budget appropriation of $438,373,174 was twice the amount
of the FY 1976 appropriation.2 9
It is significant, too, that much of this expansion of community -
based services occurred via the purchase-of-service mechanism. Only
in Region V, in southeastern Massachusetts, is DMH heavily involved
in direct provision of community-based services. In all other DMH regions,
administrators rely on private vendors. DM expenditures on purchase-
of-service have increased from $5.5 million in FY 1975 to more than $127
million in FY 1981. DMH now has approximately 2,000 contracts with about
500 providers.3 0 The financial statistics understate the reliance
of the state on private vendors, because the state subsidizes them
by placing state employees in the private programs as an in-kind
contribution. The effect of the expansion of the purchase-of-service
system has been to create a powerful, new interest pushing for the
expansion of community services. It is therefore important to consider
how the system developed.
DMH first began to rely on the contract mechanism in the
provision of mental retardation services. Associations for Retarded
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Citizens (ARCs), which are voluntary organizations made up largely of
parents of retarded children, originally came into existence to fill
a need not being filled by the state. The ARCs set up community
programs for the retarded at a time when the state did not have such
programs and when the state schools had already adopted highly restric-
tive admissions policies. When DMH, under pressure to depopulate its
institutions, particularly after the filing of the Belchertown suit,
decided to get into the provision of community-based services for the
retarded itself, it found it easier to contract with ARCs and rely on
their expertise than to develop that expertise itself.
In many instances, however, DMH wished to develop programs
which no organization was providing. In these cases, the DMH administra-
tion simply felt that the programs would be too difficult to develop
using state employees. Former DMH commissioner Robert Okin has said
that the rules which govern direct state provision of services "would
drive any business into bankruptcy." He lists specifically the constraints
of the state item budget process, civil service and collective bargaining.31
While these problems may have been seen as real obstacles, they
probably would have appeared less significant had DMH not been in such
a rush to deinstitutionalize. With the Northampton suit filed,
however, the rapid development of community programs became a high
priority. The shift to purchase-of-service contracting was therefore
exceptionally rapid. As the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation puts it:
State agencies backed into large-scale purchase of service. These
agencies did not have the structural capacity to establish standards
and expectations for programs, much less to monitor and evaluate
them. Purchase became important, almost overnight, without any
planning. 32
- 79 -
The Foundation attributes the use of private vendors in part
to an "inferiority complex" within state government:
State agencies turned to the provider community to run their
programs in large measure because of the state's failure to run
institutions that offered more than custodial care and programs
that rendered treatment intervention to clients. This inferiority
complex persists today. 3 3
It is, in fact, true that Commissioner Okin believed that
It simply makes no sense at all for us to perpetuate a publicly
operated system which guarantees inferior care to many of the
State's mentally ill citizens. The public sector should not continue
to do what the private sector, if given the right kind of support,
could do much better and more efficiently.
Okin's attitude , however, was in large measure simply a recognition
of the fact that a two-class system of mental health care exists, in
which the state provides the lower quality class of services to those
individuals unable to afford higher auality private psychiatric services.
Okin claimed he wished to provide all psychiatric services through the
private system which currently serves only the affluent. 35
Whether Okin actually believed that the two-tier system of
care could be transformed into one unified system of care is open to
debate. However, as the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation points
out, the development of a purchase-of-service system was a pragmatic
approach to expanding the mental health system during a period in which
"fiscal crisis" was an increasingly important issue in Massachusetts:
the desire to limit or reduce public payrolls has encouraged the
growth of purchase of services. Facedwith Governor Dukakis'
attrition program, state officials viewed contracting with private
vendors as a strategy to improve the administration as well as the
delivery of services without adding to the permanent payroll.3 6
DMH appropriations in the state budget increased substantially
during the period Okin was expanding the purchase-of-service system,
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from $276 million in FY 1978 to $438 million in FY 1981.37 By this point,
the DMH administration clearly saw expansion of its service system as
a major goal and, as a consequence, aggressively sought ways to increase
its revenues. For example, DMH would start new programs more slowly
than projected in its annual budget request and would then "over-
annualize." For example, DM would request, say, $100,000 to purchase
a new community program, with the understanding that the program would
commence operations half-way through the fiscal year. It was understood
that the appropriation for the same program would be annualized in the
DMH budget request for the following fiscal year, so that instead of
requesting only $100,000 for the program, DMH would request $200,000.
This recognized the fact that the original appropriation was sufficient
only to cover half a year of operation. In the first year, however,
the program would not actually begin to operate until the fiscal year
was, say, three-quarters done. DM1 would see to it, however, that in
that quarter of a year the program would spend its entire first year
appropriation, so that the following year DM would request $400,000 for
the program. In the meantime, however, residents of state institutions
which DMH had claimed would be served by the new community program
would remain institutionalized for an additional three months. DMH
would then ask for deficiency funds to cover the unanticipated costs of
caring for those residents for that period of time. Once a new program
was started, however, DMH would not release funds intended to upgrade
the program, using the funds instead to start up other new programs.
Programs which benefitted financially from the over-annualization were
often expected to hire, as part of their contracts, employees who actually
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performed the tasks of DMH administrators.3 8
The use of such techniques, combined with the effect of the
consent decrees, has served to greatly expand the DMH service system.
Interestingly, the change in the style of DM, prompted perhaps by the
decrees, has probably done more to transform public mental health
services in Massachusetts than any of the highly publicized earlier
initiatives to deinstitutionalize the mentally ill. In creating a
powerful group of service providers, DM11H has created an external force
which will create the pressure on the state administration necessary to
effect future improvements in public mental health services.
On the other hand, by creating a massive purchase-of-service
system on which it is dependent, DMH has sacrificed much of the control
which it could have had over the state mental health system. DMH is
neither administratively organized to monitor vendors, nor is it
willing to threaten them with sanctions should it find services they
provide inadequate. Vendors are in effect accountable only to themselves.
Meanwhile, there are still major questions about the quality of
services being provided to DMH clients. A Special Committee of the
Massachusetts Senate concluded in 1980 that although
community-based care is preferable to treatment provided in a
hospital setting in almost every case, the current DMH program
of deinstitutionalization contains serious flaws. Claims of
success by state officials have often been inaccurate and mis-
leading.
. . . [I]nsufficient community resources now exist for suc-
cessful deinstitutionalization. In too many cases, there has been
poor planning for the needs of both communities and patients.
Finacial management and staffing, in particular, have been
inadequate.
As a result the quality of care in many community programs
is poor. Many former mental hospital patients are released to the
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community without any after-care or are merely transferred to
small institutions such as nursing homes instead of being inte-
grated into proper community settings. The non-affluent person
who must depend on DMH still receives inferior care in the community
after being discharged from a state hospital.3 9
Moreover, with the passage of Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts,
the pressure on state government to reduce expenditures has again
increased. The legislature, perturbed not only by the rapid growth of the
DMH budget but by the lack of accountablility of DMH officials to
legislators, granted DMH a FY 1982 appropriation with no funds for
new community programs and no funds for the regional level of the DMH
bureaucracy.40 It may well be, then, that the agressive policies of DMH
in the past few years will ultimately backfire on the department
administration.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, "deinstitutionalization" has been a much
remarked upon phenomenon. The feature of deinstitutionalization which has
been most conspicuous has been the depopulation of state mental hospitals.
The other feature -- the development of community services -- has been
more conspicuous in its absence. It might even be said that the concept
of community aftercare services for discharged state hospital patients
has only become entrenched as a necessary component of the ideal of de-
institutionalization in the past decade and that this has occurred
largely because the need for these services has been felt so strongly in
their absence.
If one then wishes to explain the enormous transformation in
the delivery of public mental health services in the latter half of this
century, it is obvious that the power of the idea of deinstitutionaliza-
tion has not been the primary force producing change. In seeking other,
more powerful agents of change, one is led to examine the forces acting
upon state-level policy-makers, as it is they who make the decisions
that determine which public mental health services are provided. This
search proves fruitful, as it becomes clear that there have been a number
of powerful forces encouraging states to depopulate their mental institu-
tions.
The depopulation of institutions began at a time when state hos-
pitals were approaching a state of physical decay and were filled to
capacity. They simply could not absorb more patients, yet if the state of
- 86 -
- 87 -
the existing hospitals was any indication, no funds would be forthcoming
to build new ones. As the general population continued to grow, however,
the numbers of the mentally ill grew as well, and with every passing year
the number of people being committed to mental hospitals rose. As the
superintendents were powerless to control the stream of new admissions,
they did all that could be expected: they began to discharge patients.
They discharged their most docile chronic patients, as these would create
the fewest problems in the community. They discharged acute admissions as
soon as the most disturbing symptoms subsided, in the hope that perhaps
these would not reoccur too quickly in the outside world.
The release of patients soon became much easier as psychoactive
drugs became available. The drugs suppressed the most objectionable
symptoms of the patients. If the discharged patients were provided with
these drugs, perhaps they would disturb no one in the community. Within
the hospital, the drugs could be used as chemical straitjackets. The
institutions became much calmer environments, perhaps even permitting the
traditionally custodial institutions to provide some small measure of
treatment to their residents.
With the evolution of national social policy, maintenance of the
mentally ill in the community also presented fewer financial problems than
in the past. Before the rise of adequate and universal social benefits,
few of the mentally ill could have been released from the hospital. They
would have starved unless provided cash by the state, and the provision
of benefits to only the mentally ill could have produced serious conse-
quences, as it would have provided an incentive to other poor people
to act mentally ill. As expanding federal benefits provided under the
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Social Security Act increasingly met the needs of the poor in general,
the provision of state support for the mentally ill was no longer so
dangerous. Moreover, the federal government was itself beginning to
assume responsibility for supporting the mentally ill, along with other
needy populations.
In its desire to improve the national health care system, the
federal government was also stimulating an expansion of the supply of
nursing home beds. This provided the beleaguered hospital superintendents
with a new opportunity to ease the pressures of overcrowding. Now there
was a place to put the harmless but nevertheless burdensome chronic
patients unable to care for themselves. When the federal government
offered, through its newly-established Medicaid program, to assume half
the costs of this care, a wide number of state policy-makers undoubtedly
took notice. Nursing home operators, well aware of the presence of
Medicaid and Medicare dollars, quickly provided more beds and hospital
superintendents took advantage of their availability, releasing even more
patients.
The size of the cash transfer payments being made under the Social
Security Act was also increasing and these were soon large enough that it
became profitable to maintain the disabled in board-and-care homes for the
price of the transfer payments. The board-and-care homes proliferated and
easily outpaced nursing homes in providing accomodation to discharged
mental patients. The nursing homes beds were, in spite of the rapid
growth in their numbers, always in short supply and therefore able to
pick and choose the most manageable patients. Board-and-care homes, with
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their inferior environments, were more often in the position of needing
to take all comers, which frequently meant the mentally ill.
Unfortunately, the Social Security Act provided states with no
funds to finance community residences designed to help the mentally ill
and, accordingly, these were not built. The cost of operating these faci-
lities with mostly state funds was simply too great when compared to
the bargains available in nursing and boarding homes. At any rate, the
public was being told that CMHCs would provide the comprehensive commu-
nity care that the mentally ill outside hospitals needed. The CMHCs were
indeed supposed to provide services to the traditionally hospitalized
subpopulation of the mentally ill, but then CMHCs were supposed to pro-
vide everything to everyone, which in effect left them free to serve whom-
ever they pleased. The traditionally hospitalized were the most difficult
and unrewarding to serve and, consequently, became the least served.
Ironically, as the Social Security Act was encouraging the mainte-
nance of the mentally ill in custodial community facilities, it was
attempting to make therapeutic environments out of state hospitals. In
presenting states with the availability of Medicaid reimbursement for per-
sons in state hospitals, the federal government was making an offer the
states could not refuse. The price to the states was substantial upgrad-
ing of institutional care. This only made the states more anxious to
depopulate the hospitals, as meeting federal standards for large numbers
of patients would have been prohibitively expensive. And where the fede-
ral government was merely offering states an incentive to upgrade their
hospitals, in the 1970s the courts threatened to compel the states to do
so. Depopulation of hospitals continued unabated.
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The number of patients in state hospitals is now less than one-
third of what it was twenty-five years ago. In some states, the depopula-
tion has been especially drastic -- the number of patients in Massachu-
setts is now less than one-tenth of what it was in 1953. Community resi-
dences have, in the meantime, been built only sporadically. One of the
few states where community residences have been developed on a meaningful
scale is Massachusetts, and this was the result of a lawsuit aimed at
halting the "dumping" of mental patients in the community. If this has
made Massachusetts the "best hope of mental health reformers" across the
country, then it is especially telling that the community services pro-
vided in Massachusetts are still considered to be woefully inadequate for
meeting the needs of the mentally ill in the community.
It is belaboring the obvious to note that the change in state men-
tal health policy was not the result of purposeful, directed policy deve-
lopment. State governments were subjected to a field of pressures and in-
centives and responded as best they could. States were largely passive
actors in the transformation of policy. The impetus for change came from
many different directions, often unrelated to mental health. Mental health
policy was in large measure determined by the federal government's desire
to move the physically handicapped from scarce hospital beds to cheaper
nursing homes. It was determined by federal legislators' desire to im-
prove the living standards of the aged and the disadvantaged. It was de-
termined by many policies, unrelated to one another, which were enacted
without consideration of their consequences for the mentally ill.
What is remarkable, then, is the consistency with which these many
different forces have encouraged depopulation of state hospitals. People
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speak of "deinstitutionalization" in the past tense, as if they were
talking about a policy planned and implemented long ago. It is more ap-
propriate to view deinstitutionalization as a concept to describe what has
happened (if perhaps inaccurately), as an idea which has itself developed
alongside the changes it describes.
In the 1950s, the deinstitutionalization idea was essentially an
anti-state hospital idea. The state hospitals were horrible environments
and reformers focused on their evils more than on the necessary community
care alternatives, The idea developed a strong following because the
closing of hospitals contained elements of both humanitarian reform and
monetary savings. The need for community care alternatives was of course
a concern, but the concern found its expression in the development of the
CMHC concept. While the failures of the CMHC program are now obvious,
it is not clear that many reformers recognized the tremendous amount of
community services that would be necessary to achieve the goal of compre-
hensive community health care. It seems many advocates of deinstitution-
alization thought the mental health problem would be solved when the in-
stitutions were empty and the CMHCs built. It was not until the 1970s
that the deficiencies of the reforms in mental health were fully apparent.
Of course, once this point was reached, the need for community residences
and client-tracking became integral parts of the deinstitutionalization
concept.
This is not to deny the positive effects of deinstitutionalization
as a humanitarian movement and an impetus for improvements in mental health
care. Deinstitutionalization has been a powerful idea and is clung to by
much of the mental health profession. It was advocates of deinstitutiona-
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lization that were responsible for the development of the CMHC program.
While CMHCs have not served the traditionally hospitalized mentally ill,
they have nevertheless provided valuable services to many less severely
ill (but nevertheless ill) people. In Massachusetts, the lawsuits which
produced the first meaningful development of community services were filed
by people attempting to make the state system more closely approach the
ideal embodied in the deinstitutionalization concept. The point is,
simply, that policy development within state government has never been
driven by the ideal of deinstitutionalization.
States have, nevertheless, been able to rely on the idea of de-
institutionalization to legitimate the changes they have made in their
mental health systems. When depopulation of institutions became attrac-
tive to states for fiscal reasons, states would shamelessly justify it
as the implementation of the humanitarian ideal, even when the consequence
was "reinstitutionalization" of the discharged patients in nursing homes.
In this regard, the role of the idea of deinstitutionalization bears
striking similarities to the role of the institutionalization idea in the
19th century with its "humanitarian gloss" that lingered long after the
hospitals had degenerated into custodial facilities. If deinstitutionali-
zation had not been a popular cause when depopulation began, it is ques-
tionable whether depopulation could have progressed as far as it has.
With all the problems which have resulted from the changes in men-
tal health policy, it is, after all, difficult to argue that the outcomes
have, on balance, been less desirable than could have been expected if the
traditional institutional pattern of care had remained intact. Perhaps the
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strongest criticism which can be made is that the elderly chronically ill
have been shovelled off to nursing homes to live there until they die. It
is not clear, though, that their situation would be much better in a state
hospital. While the younger chronic and revolving-door populations in
board-and-care home settings often live in poor conditions, hospital con-
ditions can be equally as bad. Moreover, many of these patients undoubtedly
value their liberty outside the hospital over the comforts a hospital
might provide. A large number of the mentally ill are now cared for in
family homes, but this has always been the case. The quality of care de-
pends upon the family. Although the costs to the family of caring for a
mentally ill member are great, they are often willingly assumed.
Framing the issue in terms of deinstitutionalization versus insti-
tutionalization obscures the more fundamental issue of what quality care
is received by the mentally ill. The pioneers of institutional care in the
19th century proved that institutions can be effective treatment settings
for the mentally ill. The same has been proven for community care with
many successful demonstration projects. In the past thirty years, however,
institutional care has been assumed to always be ineffective and inhumane,
while community-based care has more often been judged against the standard
of an ideal therapeutic setting.
Nevertheless, it is increasingly being recognized that hospitals
have a role to play in a comprehensive system of mental health care, if
only because it is unfeasible to construct many small secure facilities
in the community. If the mentally ill are to be rehabilitated to the li-
mits of their capacities, however, there is clearly an important role for
many different community-based services. There is a role for transitional
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community residences, to help chronic patients adjust to a more normal
lifestyle. There is a role for readily available outpatient services,
both for the revolving-door population and for the chronically ill who
live independently. There is a role for active client-tracking, to ensure
that the mentally ill are not lost "through the cracks" between community
services. A comprehensive mental health care system would, unfortunately,
cost many times what the most costlyhospital system ever cost. Knowing that
depopulation of institutions has been motivated largely by the desire to
decrease mental health expenditures, it seems highly unlikely that such
a system will develop in the foreseeable future.
For more than a century, society has proven unwilling to commit
sufficiently large amounts of resources to provide the mentally ill with
much beyond custodial care. This is somewhat understandable -- the men-
tally ill are a group with which most people have very little contact and
with which the general public must find it difficult to identify. Perhaps
the existence of an idea such as deinstitutionalization is necessary to
reassure the general public that something good is being done to help these
unfortunates, so that government may go about its business of dealing with
these people pragmatically without risking loss of public confidence. A
group such as the mentally ill (and especially the indigent mentally ill)
is clearly one of the groups in society which is least able to pursue and
protect its own interests in the political arena. It is a group which
public administrators and politicians can claim they are serving effectively
with little fear of contradiction from the group itself.
It may be sad, but it appears that it is true, that the brightest
hope for improvement in the lot of the mentally ill lies in those areas
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where improvement of the public mental health system serves the interests
of other groups in society. Where the amount of services provided is con-
cerned, the strongest push for expansion will probably come from the net-
work of private service providers who have an interest in increasing their
profits. Where the quality of services is concerned, the push will come
from the mental health workers who themselves suffer when they must work
in understaffed, underfinanced programs. Improvement is certainly not
likely to come from within the ranks of the mentally disabled themselves --
they have been provided with inferior services for so many decades that
if they were ever to be expected to help themselves, they would have done
it long ago.
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